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Status of this Memo
   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
   This document presents an object-oriented information model of IP
   Security (IPsec) policy designed to facilitate agreement about the
   content and semantics of IPsec policy, and enable derivations of
   task-specific representations of IPsec policy such as storage schema,
   distribution representations, and policy specification languages used
   to configure IPsec-enabled endpoints.  The information model
   described in this document models the configuration parameters
   defined by IPSec.  The information model also covers the parameters
   found by the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKE).  Other key
   exchange protocols could easily be added to the information model by
   a simple extension.  Further extensions can further be added easily
   due to the object-oriented nature of the model.
   This information model is based upon the core policy classes as
   defined in the Policy Core Information Model (PCIM) and in the Policy
   Core Information Model Extensions (PCIMe).
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1. Introduction
   IP security (IPsec) policy may assume a variety of forms as it
   travels from storage, to distribution, to decision points.  At each
   step, it needs to be represented in a way that is convenient for the
   current task.  For example, the policy could exist as, but is not
   limited to:
   o  A Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [LDAP] schema in a
      directory.
   o  An on-the-wire representation over a transport protocol like the
      Common Object Policy Service (COPS) [COPS, COPSPR].
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   o  A text-based policy specification language suitable for editing by
      an administrator.
   o  An Extensible Markup Language (XML) document.
   Each of these task-specific representations should be derived from a
   canonical representation that precisely specifies the content and
   semantics of the IPsec policy.  This document captures this concept
   and introduces a task-independent canonical representation for IPsec
   policies.
   This document focuses mainly on the existing protocols [COMP, ESP,
   AH, DOI, IKE].  The model can easily be extended if needed due to its
   object-oriented nature.
   This document is organized as follows:
   o  Section 2 provides a quick introduction to the Unified Modeling
      Language (UML) graphical notation conventions used in this
      document.
   o  Section 3 provides the inheritance hierarchy that describes where
      the IPsec policy classes fit into the policy class hierarchy
      already defined by the Policy Core Information Model (PCIM) and
      Policy Core Information Model Extensions (PCIMe).
   o  Sections 4 through 8 describe the classes that make up the IPsec
      policy model.
   o  Section 9 presents the implementation requirements for the classes
      in the model (i.e., the MUST/MAY/SHOULD status).
   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].
2. UML Conventions
   For this document, a UML static class diagram was chosen as the
   canonical representation for the IPsec policy model, because UML
   provides a graphical, task-independent way to model systems.  A
   treatise on the graphical notation used in UML is beyond the scope of
   this paper.  However, given the use of ASCII drawing for UML static
   class diagrams, a description of the notational conventions used in
   this document is in order:
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   o  Boxes represent classes, with class names in brackets ([])
      representing an abstract class.
   o  A line that terminates with an arrow (<, >, ^, v) denotes
      inheritance.  The arrow always points to the parent class.
      Inheritance can also be called generalization or specialization
      (depending upon the reference point).  A base class is a
      generalization of a derived class, and a derived class is a
      specialization of a base class.
   o  Associations are used to model a relationship between two classes.
      Classes that share an association are connected using a line.  A
      special kind of association is also used:  an aggregation.  An
      aggregation models a whole-part relationship between two classes.
      Associations, and therefore aggregations, are also modeled as
      classes.
   o  A line that begins with an "o" denotes aggregation.  Aggregation
      denotes containment in which the contained class and the
      containing class have independent lifetimes.
   o  At each end of a line representing an association appears a
      cardinality (i.e., each association has 2 cardinalities).
      Cardinalities indicate the constraints on the number of object
      instances in a set of relationships.  The cardinality on a given
      end of an association indicates the number of different object
      instances of that class that may be associated with a single
      object instance of the class on the other end of the association.
      The cardinality may be:
      -  a range in the form "lower bound..upper bound" indicating the
         minimum and maximum number of objects.
      -  a number that indicates the exact number of objects.
      -  an asterisk indicating any number of objects, including zero.
         An asterisk is shorthand for 0..n.
      -  the letter n indicating from 1 to many.  The letter n is
         shorthand for 1..n.
   o  A class that has an association may have a "w" next to the line
      representing the association.  This is called a weak association
      and is discussed in [PCIM].
   It should be noted that the UML static class diagram presented is a
   conceptual view of IPsec policy designed to aid in understanding.  It
   does not necessarily get translated class for class into another
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   representation.  For example, an LDAP implementation may flatten out
   the representation to fewer classes (because of the inefficiency of
   following references).
3. IPsec Policy Model Inheritance Hierarchy
   Like PCIM and PCIMe, the IPsec Configuration Policy Model derives
   from and uses classes defined in the DMTF [DMTF] Common Information
   Model (CIM).  The following tree represents the inheritance hierarchy
   for the IPsec Policy Model classes and how they fit into PCIM, PCIMe
   and the other DMTF models (see Appendices for descriptions of classes
   that are not being introduced as part of IPsec model).  CIM classes
   that are not used as a superclass to derive new classes, but are used
   only as references, are not included in this inheritance hierarchy,
   but can be found in the appropriate DMTF document:  Core Model
   [CIMCORE], User Model [CIMUSER] or, Network Model [CIMNETWORK].
         ManagedElement (DMTF Core Model)
         |
         +--Collection (DMTF Core Model)
         |  |
         |  +--PeerIdentityTable
         |
         +--ManagedSystemElement (DMTF Core Model)
         |  |
         |  +--LogicalElement (DMTF Core Model)
         |     |
         |     +--FilterEntryBase (DMTF Network Model)
         |     |  |
         |     |  +--CredentialFilterEntry
         |     |  |
         |     |  +--IPHeadersFilter (PCIMe)
         |     |  |
         |     |  +--IPSOFilterEntry
         |     |  |
         |     |  +--PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry
         |     |
         |     +--PeerGateway
         |     |
         |     +--PeerIdentityEntry
         |     |
         |     +--Service (DMTF Core Model)
         |        |
         |        +--IKEService
         |
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         +--OrganizationalEntity (DMTF User Model)
         |  |
         |  +--UserEntity (DMTF User Model)
         |     |
         |     +--UsersAccess (DMTF User Model)
         |        |
         |        +--IKEIdentity
         |
         +--Policy (PCIM)
         |  |
         |  +--PolicyAction (PCIM)
         |  |  |
         |  |  +--CompoundPolicyAction (PCIMe)
         |  |  |
         |  |  +--SAAction
         |  |     |
         |  |     +--SANegotiationAction
         |  |     |  |
         |  |     |  +--IKENegotiationAction
         |  |     |     |
         |  |     |     +--IKEAction
         |  |     |     |
         |  |     |     +--IPsecAction
         |  |     |        |
         |  |     |        +--IPsecTransportAction
         |  |     |        |
         |  |     |        +--IPsecTunnelAction
         |  |     |
         |  |     +--SAStaticAction
         |  |        |
         |  |        +--IKERejectAction
         |  |        |
         |  |        +--IPsecBypassAction
         |  |        |
         |  |        +--IPsecDiscardAction
         |  |        |
         |  |        +--PreconfiguredSAAction
         |  |           |
         |  |           +--PreconfiguredTransportAction
         |  |           |
         |  |           +--PreconfiguredTunnelAction
         |  |
         |  +--PolicyCondition (PCIM)
         |  |  |
         |  |  +--SACondition
         |  |
         |  +--PolicySet (PCIMe)
         |  |  |
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         |  |  +--PolicyGroup (PCIM & PCIMe)
         |  |  |
         |  |  +--PolicyRule (PCIM & PCIMe)
         |  |     |
         |  |     +--SARule
         |  |        |
         |  |        +--IKERule
         |  |        |
         |  |        +--IPsecRule
         |  |
         |  +--SAProposal
         |  |  |
         |  |  +--IKEProposal
         |  |  |
         |  |  +--IPsecProposal
         |  |
         |  +--SATransform
         |     |
         |     +--AHTransform
         |     |
         |     +--ESPTransform
         |     |
         |     +--IPCOMPTransform
         |
         +--Setting (DMTF Core Model)
         |  |
         |  +--SystemSetting (DMTF Core Model)
         |     |
         |     +--AutostartIKESetting
         |
         +--SystemConfiguration (DMTF Core Model)
            |
            +--AutostartIKEConfiguration
   The following tree represents the inheritance hierarchy of the IPsec
   policy model association classes and how they fit into PCIM and the
   other DMTF models (see Appendices for description of association
   classes that are not being introduced as part of IPsec model).
         Dependency (DMTF Core Model)
         |
         +--AcceptCredentialsFrom
         |
         +--ElementAsUser (DMTF User Model)
         |  |
         |  +--EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity
         |  |
         |  +--CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity
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         |
         +--FilterOfSACondition
         |
         +--HostedPeerGatewayInformation
         |
         +--HostedPeerIdentityTable
         |
         +--IKEAutostartConfiguration
         |
         +--IKEServiceForEndpoint
         |
         +--IKEServicePeerGateway
         |
         +--IKEServicePeerIdentityTable
         |
         +--IKEUsesCredentialManagementService
         |
         +--IPsecPolicyForEndpoint
         |
         +--IPsecPolicyForSystem
         |
         +--PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel
         |
         +--PeerGatewayForTunnel
         |
         +--PolicyInSystem (PCIM)
         |  |
         |  +--SAProposalInSystem
         |  |
         |  +--SATransformInSystem
         |
         +--TransformOfPreconfiguredAction
         |
         +--UsersCredential (DMTF User Model)
            |
            +--IKEIdentitysCredential
         ElementSetting (DMTF Core Model)
         |
         +--IKEAutostartSetting
         MemberOfCollection (DMTF Core Model)
         |
         +--PeerIdentityMember
         PolicyComponent (PCIM)
         |
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         +--ContainedProposal
         |
         +--ContainedTransform
         |
         +--PolicyActionStructure (PCIMe)
         |  |
         |  +--PolicyActionInPolicyRule (PCIM & PCIMe)
         |     |
         |     +--PolicyActionInSARule
         |
         +--PolicyConditionStructure (PCIMe)
         |  |
         |  +--PolicyConditionInPolicyRule (PCIM & PCIMe)
         |     |
         |     +--SAConditionInRule
         |
         +--PolicySetComponent (PCIMe)
         SystemSettingContext (DMTF Core Model)
         |
         +--AutostartIKESettingContext
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4. Policy Classes
   The IPsec policy classes represent the set of policies that are
   contained on a system.
                                  +--------------+
                                  | [PolicySet]  |*
                                  |  ([PCIME])   |o--+
                                  +--------------+   |
                                         ^   *|      |(a)
                                         |    +------+
              +--------------------------+
              |                          |
       +-------------+            +--------------+
       | PolicyGroup |0..1        |  PolicyRule  |*
       |  ([PCIM])   |-----+      |  ([PCIM])    |o--+
       +-------------+     |      +--------------+   |(d)
          0..1|            |            ^            |
              |(b)         |            |            |*
             *|            |            | +---------------------------+
   +--------------------+  |(c)         | | PolicyTimePeriodCondition |
   | IPProtocolEndpoint |  |            | |         ([PCIM])          |
   |   ([CIMNETWORK])   |  |            | +---------------------------+
   +--------------------+  |            |
         +------------+    |      *+----------+*
         |   System   |----+    +-o|  SARule  |o-------+
         | ([CIMCORE])|*        |  +----------+        |(f)
         +------------+         |       ^              |
                             (e)|       |              |n
         +-------------+n       |       |        +--------------+
         | SACondition |--------+       |        |[PolicyAction]|
         +-------------+                |        |   ([PCIM])   |
                                        |        +--------------+
                                        |          *|        ^
                                        |           |(g)     |
                                        |           |        +-------+
                                        |          *o        |       |
                                        |  +----------------------+  |
                                        |  | CompoundPolicyAction |  |
                                        |  |       ([PCIME])      |  |
                                        |  +----------------------+  |
                                        |                            |
                              +---------+----+             +---------+
                              |              |             |
                         +---------+   +-----------+   +----------+
                         | IKERule |   | IPsecRule |   | SAAction |
                         +---------+   +-----------+   +----------+
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      (a)  PolicySetComponent ([PCIME])
      (b)  IPsecPolicyForEndpoint
      (c)  IPsecPolicyForSystem
      (d)  PolicyRuleValidityPeriod ([PCIM])
      (e)  SAConditionInRule
      (f)  PolicyActionInSARule
      (g)  PolicyActionInPolicyAction ([PCIME])
   A PolicyGroup represents the set of policies that are used on an
   interface.   This PolicyGroup SHOULD be associated either directly
   with the IPProtocolEndpoint class instance that represents the
   interface (via the IPsecPolicyForEndpoint association) or indirectly
   (via the IPsecPolicyForSystem association) associated with the System
   that hosts the interface.
   The IKE and IPsec rules are used to build or to negotiate the IPsec
   Security Association Database (SADB).  The IPsec rules represent the
   Security Policy Database.  The SADB itself is not modeled by this
   document.
   The IKE and IPsec rules can be described as (also see section 6 about
   actions):
   o  An egress unprotected packet will first be checked against the
      IPsec rules.  If a match is found, the SADB will be checked.  If
      there is no corresponding IPsec SA in the SADB, and if IKE
      negotiation is required by the IPsec rule, the corresponding IKE
      rules will be used.  The negotiated or preconfigured SA will then
      be installed in the SADB.
   o  An ingress unprotected packet will first be checked against the
      IPsec rules.  If a match is found, the SADB will be checked for a
      corresponding IPsec SA.  If there is no corresponding IPsec SA and
      a preconfigured SA exists, this preconfigured SA will be installed
      in the IPsec SADB.  This behavior should only apply to bypass and
      discard actions.
   o  An ingress protected packet will first be checked against the
      IPsec rules.  If a match is found, the SADB will be checked for a
      corresponding IPsec SA.  If there is no corresponding IPsec SA and
      a preconfigured SA exists, this preconfigured SA will be installed
      in the IPsec SADB.
   o  An ingress IKE negotiation packet, which is not part of an
      existing IKE SA, will be checked against the IKE rules.  The
      SACondition for the IKERule will usually be composed of a
      PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry (typically for an aggressive mode IKE
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      negotiation) or an IPHeadersFilter.  The negotiated SA will then
      be installed in the SADB.
   It is expected that when an IKE negotiation is required to be
   initiated by an IPsec rule, the set of IKE rules will be checked.
   The IKE rules check will be based on the outgoing IKE packet using
   IPHeadersFilter entries (typically using the HdrDstAddress property).
4.1. The Class SARule
   The class SARule serves as a base class for IKERule and IPsecRule.
   Even though the class is concrete, it MUST not be instantiated.  It
   defines a common connection point for associations to conditions and
   actions for both types of rules.  Through its derivation from
   PolicyRule, an SARule (and therefore IKERule and IPsecRule) also has
   the PolicyRuleValidityPeriod association.
   Each SARule in a valid PolicyGroup MUST have a unique associated
   priority number in the PolicySetComponent.Priority.  The class
   definition for SARule is as follows:
      NAME         SARule
      DESCRIPTION  A base class for IKERule and IPsecRule.
      DERIVED FROM PolicyRule (see [PCIM] & [PCIME])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   PolicyRuleName (from PolicyRule)
                   Enabled (from PolicyRule)
                   ConditionListType (from PolicyRule)
                   RuleUsage (from PolicyRule)
                   Mandatory (from PolicyRule)
                   SequencedActions (from PolicyRule)
                   ExecutionStrategy (from PolicyRule)
                   PolicyRoles (from PolicySet)
                   PolicyDecisionStrategy (from PolicySet)
                   LimitNegotiation
4.1.1. The Properties PolicyRuleName, Enabled, ConditionListType,
       RuleUsage, Mandatory, SequencedActions, PolicyRoles, and
       PolicyDecisionStrategy
   For a description of these properties, see [PCIM] and [PCIME].
   In SARule subclass instances:
   -  if the property Mandatory exists, it MUST be set to "true".
   -  if the property SequencedActions exists, it MUST be set to
      "mandatory".
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   -  the property PolicyRoles is not used in the device-level model.
   -  if the property PolicyDecisionStrategy exists, it must be set to
      "FirstMatching".
4.1.2. The Property ExecutionStrategy
   The ExecutionStrategy properties in the PolicyRule subclasses (and in
   the CompoundPolicyAction class) determine the behavior of the
   contained actions.  It defines the strategy to be used in executing
   the sequenced actions aggregated by a rule or a compound action.  In
   the case of actions within a rule, the PolicyActionInSARule
   aggregation is used to collect the actions into an ordered set; in
   the case of a compound action, the PolicyActionInPolicyAction
   aggregation is used to collect the actions into an ordered subset.
   There are three execution strategies: do until success, do all, and
   do until failure.
   "Do Until Success" causes the execution of actions according to the
   ActionOrder property in the aggregation instances until a successful
   execution of a single action.  These actions may be evaluated to
   determine if they are appropriate to execute rather than blindly
   trying each of the actions until one succeeds.  For an initiator,
   they are tried in the ActionOrder until the list is exhausted or one
   completes successfully.  For example, an IKE initiator may have
   several IKEActions for the same SACondition.  The initiator will try
   all IKEActions in the order defined by ActionOrder.  I.e., it will
   possibly try several phase 1 negotiations with different modes (main
   mode then aggressive mode) and/or with multiple IKE peers.  For a
   responder, when there is more than one action in the rule with "do
   until success" condition clause, this provides alternative actions
   depending on the received proposals.  For example, the same IKERule
   may be used to handle aggressive mode and main mode negotiations with
   different actions.  The responder uses the first appropriate action
   in the list of actions.
   "Do All" causes the execution of all the actions in the aggregated
   set according to their defined order.  The execution continues
   regardless of failures.
   "Do Until Failure" causes the execution of all actions according to a
   predefined order until the first failure in execution of an action
   instance.  Please note that if all actions are successful, then the
   aggregated result is a failure.  This execution strategy is inherited
   from [PCIME] and is not expected to be of any use for IPsec
   configuration.
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   For example, in a nested SAs case, the actions of an initiator’s rule
   might be structured as:
   IPsecRule.ExecutionStrategy=’Do All’
   |
   +---1--- IPsecTunnelAction    // set up SA from host to gateway
   |
   +---2--- IPsecTransportAction // set up SA from host through
                                 // tunnel to remote host
   Another example, showing a rule with fallback actions might be
   structured as:
   IPsecRule.ExecutionStrategy=’Do Until Success’
   |
   +---6--- IPsecTransportAction // negotiate SA with peer
   |
   +---9--- IPsecBypassAction    // but if you must, allow in the clear
   The CompoundPolicyAction class (See [PCIME]) may be used in
   constructing the actions of IKE and IPsec rules when those rules
   specify both multiple actions and fallback actions.  The
   ExecutionStrategy property in CompoundPolicyAction is used in
   conjunction with that in the PolicyRule.
   For example, in nesting SAs with a fallback security gateway, the
   actions of a rule might be structured as:
   IPsecRule.ExecutionStrategy=’Do All’
   |
   +---1--- CompoundPolicyAction.ExecutionStrategy=’Do Until Success’
   |        |
   |        +---1--- IPsecTunnelAction  // set up SA from host to
   |        |                           // gateway1
   |        |
   |        +---2--- IPsecTunnelAction  // or set up SA to gateway2
   |
   +---2--- IPsecTransportAction        // then set up SA from host
                                        // through tunnel to remote
                                        // host
   In the case of "Do All", a couple of actions can be executed
   successfully before a subsequent action fails.  In this case, some
   IKE or IPsec actions may have resulted in SAs creation.  Even if the
   net effect of the aggregated actions is failure, those created SAs
   MAY be kept or MAY be deleted.
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   In the case of "Do All", the IPsec selectors to be used during IPsec
   SA negotiation are:
   -  for the last IPsecAction of the aggregation (i.e., usually the
      innermost IPsec SA): this is the combination of the
      IPHeadersFilter class and of the Granularity property of the
      IPsecAction.
   -  for all other IPsecActions of the aggregation: the selector is the
      source IP address which is the local IP address, and the
      destination IP address is the PeerGateway IP address of the
      following IPsecAction of the "Do All" aggregation.  NB: the
      granularity is IP address to IP address.
   If the above behavior is not desirable, the alternative is to define
   several SARules, one for each IPsec SA to be built.  This will allow
   the definition of specific IPsec selectors for all IPsecActions.
4.1.3  The Property LimitNegotiation
   The property LimitNegotiation is used as part of processing either an
   IKE or an IPsec rule.
   Before proceeding with a phase 1 negotiation, this property is
   checked to determine whether the negotiation role of the rule matches
   that defined for the negotiation being undertaken (e.g., Initiator,
   Responder, or Both).  If this check fails (e.g., the current role is
   IKE responder, while the rule specifies IKE initiator), then the IKE
   negotiation is stopped.  Note that this only applies to new IKE phase
   1 negotiations and has no effect on either renegotiation or refresh
   operations with peers for which an established SA already exists.
   Before proceeding with a phase 2 negotiation, the LimitNegotiation
   property of the IPsecRule is first checked to determine if the
   negotiation role indicated for the rule matches that of the current
   negotiation (Initiator, Responder, or Either).  Note that this limit
   applies only to new phase 2 negotiations.  It is ignored when an
   attempt is made to refresh an expiring SA (either side can initiate a
   refresh operation).  The IKE system can determine that the
   negotiation is a refresh operation by checking to see if the selector
   information matches that of an existing SA.  If LimitNegotiation does
   not match and the selector corresponds to a new SA, the negotiation
   is stopped.
Jason, et al.               Standards Track                    [Page 16]
RFC 3585            IPsec Configuration Policy Model         August 2003
   The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         LimitNegotiation
      DESCRIPTION  Limits the role to be undertaken during negotiation.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        1 - initiator-only
                   2 - responder-only
                   3 - both
4.2. The Class IKERule
   The class IKERule associates Conditions and Actions for IKE phase 1
   negotiations.  The class definition for IKERule is as follows:
      NAME         IKERule
      DESCRIPTION  Associates Conditions and Actions for IKE phase 1
                   negotiations.
      DERIVED FROM SARule
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   same as SARule, plus
                   IdentityContexts
4.2.1. The Property IdentityContexts
   The IKE service of a security endpoint may have multiple identities
   for use in different situations.  The combination of the interface
   (represented by the IPProtocolEndpoint or by a collection of
   IPProtocolEndpoints), the identity type (as specified in the
   IKEAction), and the IdentityContexts specifies a unique identity.
   The IdentityContexts property specifies the context to select the
   relevant IKE identity to be used during the further IKEAction.  A
   context may be a VPN name or other identifier for selecting the
   appropriate identity for use on the protected IPProtocolEndpoint (or
   collection of IPProtocolEndpoints).
   IdentityContexts is an array of strings.  The multiple values in the
   array are logically ORed together in evaluating the IdentityContexts.
   Each value in the array may be the composition of multiple context
   names.  So, a single value may be a single context name (e.g.,
   "CompanyXVPN"), or it may be combination of contexts.  When an array
   value is a composition, the individual values are logically ANDed
   together for evaluation purposes and the syntax is:
      <ContextName>[&&<ContextName>]*
   where the individual context names appear in alphabetical order
   (according to the collating sequence for UCS-2).  So, for example,
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   the values "CompanyXVPN", "CompanyYVPN&&TopSecret",
   "CompanyZVPN&&Confidential" means that, for the appropriate
   IPProtocolEndpoint and IdentityType, the contexts are matched if the
   identity specifies "CompanyXVPN", "CompanyYVPN&&TopSecret", or
   "CompanyZVPN&&Confidential".
   The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         IdentityContexts
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the context in which to select the IKE
                   identity.
      SYNTAX       string array
4.3. The Class IPsecRule
   The class IPsecRule associates Conditions and Actions for IKE phase 2
   negotiations for the IPsec DOI.  The class definition for IPsecRule
   is as follows:
      NAME         IPsecRule
      DESCRIPTION  Associates Conditions and Actions for IKE phase 2
                   negotiations for the IPsec DOI.
      DERIVED FROM SARule
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   same as SARule
4.4. The Association Class IPsecPolicyForEndpoint
   The class IPsecPolicyForEndpoint associates a PolicyGroup with a
   specific network interface.  If an IPProtocolEndpoint of a system
   does not have an IPsecPolicyForEndpoint-associated PolicyGroup, then
   the IPsecPolicyForSystem associated PolicyGroup is used for that
   endpoint.  The class definition for IPsecPolicyForEndpoint is as
   follows:
      NAME         IPsecPolicyForEndpoint
      DESCRIPTION  Associates a policy group to a network interface.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent[ref IPProtocolEndpoint[0..n]]
                   Dependent[ref PolicyGroup[0..1]]
4.4.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to an IPProtocolEndpoint instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that a PolicyGroup instance may be associated
   with zero or more IPProtocolEndpoint instances.
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4.4.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to a PolicyGroup instance.  The [0..1] cardinality indicates
   that an IPProtocolEndpoint instance may have an association to at
   most one PolicyGroup instance.
4.5. The Association Class IPsecPolicyForSystem
   The class IPsecPolicyForSystem associates a PolicyGroup with a
   specific system.  If an IPProtocolEndpoint of a system does not have
   an IPsecPolicyForEndpoint-associated PolicyGroup, then the
   IPsecPolicyForSystem associated PolicyGroup is used for that
   endpoint.  The class definition for IPsecPolicyForSystem is as
   follows:
      NAME         IPsecPolicyForSystem
      DESCRIPTION  Default policy group for a system.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent[ref System[0..n]]
                   Dependent[ref PolicyGroup[0..1]]
4.5.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to a System instance.  The [0..n] cardinality
   indicates that a PolicyGroup instance may have an association to zero
   or more System instances.
4.5.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to a PolicyGroup instance.  The [0..1] cardinality indicates
   that a System instance may have an association to at most one
   PolicyGroup instance.
4.6. The Aggregation Class SAConditionInRule
   The class SAConditionInRule associates an SARule with the SACondition
   instance(s) that trigger(s) it.  The class definition for
   SAConditionInRule is as follows:
      NAME         SAConditionInRule
      DESCRIPTION  Associates an SARule with the SACondition instance(s)
                   that trigger(s) it.
      DERIVED FROM PolicyConditionInPolicyRule (see [PCIM] & [PCIME])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
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      PROPERTIES   GroupNumber (from PolicyConditionInPolicyRule)
                   ConditionNegated (from PolicyConditionInPolicyRule)
                   GroupComponent [ref SARule [0..n]]
                   PartComponent [ref SACondition [1..n]]
4.6.1. The Properties GroupNumber and ConditionNegated
   For a description of these properties, see [PCIM].
4.6.2. The Reference GroupComponent
   The property GroupComponent is inherited from
   PolicyConditionInPolicyRule and is overridden to refer to an SARule
   instance.  The [0..n] cardinality indicates that an SACondition
   instance may be contained in zero or more SARule instances.
4.6.3. The Reference PartComponent
   The property PartComponent is inherited from
   PolicyConditionInPolicyRule and is overridden to refer to an
   SACondition instance.  The [1..n] cardinality indicates that an
   SARule instance MUST contain at least one SACondition instance.
4.7. The Aggregation Class PolicyActionInSARule
   The PolicyActionInSARule class associates an SARule with one or more
   PolicyAction instances.  In all cases where an SARule is being used,
   the contained actions MUST be either subclasses of SAAction or
   instances of CompoundPolicyAction.  For an IKERule, the contained
   actions MUST be related to phase 1 processing, i.e., IKEAction or
   IKERejectAction.  Similarly, for an IPsecRule, contained actions MUST
   be related to phase 2 or preconfigured SA processing, e.g.,
   IPsecTransportAction, IPsecBypassAction, etc.  The class definition
   for PolicyActionInSARule is as follows:
      NAME         PolicyActionInSARule
      DESCRIPTION  Associates an SARule with its PolicyAction(s).
      DERIVED FROM PolicyActionInPolicyRule (see [PCIM] & [PCIME])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   GroupComponent [ref SARule [0..n]]
                   PartComponent [ref PolicyAction [1..n]]
                   ActionOrder (from PolicyActionInPolicyRule)
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4.7.1. The Reference GroupComponent
   The property GroupComponent is inherited from
   PolicyActionInPolicyRule and is overridden to refer to an SARule
   instance.  The [0..n] cardinality indicates that an SAAction instance
   may be contained in zero or more SARule instances.
4.7.2. The Reference PartComponent
   The property PartComponent is inherited from PolicyActionInPolicyRule
   and is overridden to refer to an SAAction or CompoundPolicyAction
   instance.  The [1..n] cardinality indicates that an SARule instance
   MUST contain at least one SAAction or CompoundPolicyAction instance.
4.7.3. The Property ActionOrder
   The property ActionOrder is inherited from the superclass
   PolicyActionInPolicyRule.  It specifies the relative position of this
   PolicyAction in the sequence of actions associated with a PolicyRule.
   The ActionOrder MUST be unique so as to provide a deterministic
   order.  In addition, the actions in an SARule are executed as
   follows.  See section 4.2.2, ExecutionStrategy, for a discussion on
   the use of the ActionOrder property.
   The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         ActionOrder
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the order of actions.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Any value between 1 and 2^16-1 inclusive.  Lower
                   values have higher precedence (i.e., 1 is the
                   highest precedence).  The merging order of two
                   SAActions with the same precedence is undefined.
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5. Condition and Filter Classes
   The IPsec condition and filter classes are used to build the "if"
   part of the IKE and IPsec rules.
                       *+-------------+
   +--------------------| SACondition |
   |                    +-------------+
   |                         * |
   |                           |(a)
   |                         1 |
   |                   +---------------+
   |                   |  FilterList   |
   |                   |([CIMNETWORK]) |
   |                   +---------------+
   |                         1 o
   |(b)                        |(c)
   |                         * |
   |                   +-----------------+
   |                   | FilterEntryBase |
   |                   | ([CIMNETWORK])  |
   |                   +-----------------+
   |                           ^
   |                           |
   |    +-----------------+    |    +-----------------------+
   |    | IPHeadersFilter |----+----| CredentialFilterEntry |
   |    |   ([PCIME])     |    |    +-----------------------+
   |    +-----------------+    |
   |                           |
   |    +-----------------+    |    +--------------------------+
   |    | IPSOFilterEntry |----+----| PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry |
   |    +-----------------+         +--------------------------+
   |
   |           *+-----------------------------+
   +------------| CredentialManagementService |
                |         ([CIMUSER])         |
                +-----------------------------+
      (a)  FilterOfSACondition
      (b)  AcceptCredentialsFrom
      (c)  EntriesInFilterList (see [CIMNETWORK])
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5.1. The Class SACondition
   The class SACondition defines the conditions of rules for IKE and
   IPsec negotiations.  Conditions are associated with policy rules via
   the SAConditionInRule aggregation.  It is used as an anchor point to
   associate various types of filters with policy rules via the
   FilterOfSACondition association.  It also defines whether Credentials
   can be accepted for a particular policy rule via the
   AcceptCredentialsFrom association.
   Associated objects represent components of the condition that may or
   may not apply at a given rule evaluation.  For example, an
   AcceptCredentialsFrom evaluation is only performed when a credential
   is available to be evaluated against the list of trusted credential
   management services.  Similarly, a PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry may only
   be evaluated when an IDPayload value is available to compare with the
   filter.  Condition components that do not have corresponding values
   with which to evaluate are evaluated as TRUE unless the protocol has
   completed without providing the required information.
   The class definition for SACondition is as follows:
      NAME         SACondition
      DESCRIPTION  Defines the preconditions for IKE and IPsec
                   negotiations.
      DERIVED FROM PolicyCondition (see [PCIM])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   PolicyConditionName (from PolicyCondition)
5.2. The Class IPHeadersFilter
   The class IPHeadersFilter is defined in [PCIME] with the following
   note:
   1) to specify 5-tuple filters that are to apply symmetrically (i.e.,
      matches traffic in both directions of the same flows which is
      quite typical for SPD entries for ingress and egress traffic), the
      Direction property of the FilterList SHOULD be set to "Mirrored".
5.3. The Class CredentialFilterEntry
   The class CredentialFilterEntry defines an equivalence class that
   match credentials of IKE peers.  Each CredentialFilterEntry includes
   a MatchFieldName that is interpreted according to the
   CredentialManagementService(s) associated with the SACondition
   (AcceptCredentialsFrom).
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   These credentials can be X.509 certificates, Kerberos tickets, or
   other types of credentials obtained during the Phase 1 exchange.
   Note: this filter entry will probably be checked while the IKE
   negotiation takes place.  If the check is a failure, then the IKE
   negotiation MUST be stopped, and the result of the IKEAction which
   triggered this negotiation is a failure.
   The class definition for CredentialFilterEntry is as follows:
      NAME         CredentialFilterEntry
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies a match filter based on the IKE
                   credentials.
      DERIVED FROM FilterEntryBase (see [CIMNETWORK])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Name (from FilterEntryBase)
                   IsNegated (from FilterEntryBase)
                   MatchFieldName
                   MatchFieldValue
                   CredentialType
5.3.1. The Property MatchFieldName
   The property MatchFieldName specifies the sub-part of the credential
   to match against MatchFieldValue.  The property is defined as
   follows:
      NAME         MatchFieldName
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies which sub-part of the credential to match.
      SYNTAX       string
      VALUE        This is the string representation of a X.509
                   certificate attribute, e.g.:
                   - "serialNumber"
                   - "signatureAlgorithm"
                   - "issuerName"
                   - "subjectName"
                   - "subjectAltName"
                   - ...
5.3.2. The Property MatchFieldValue
   The property MatchFieldValue specifies the value to compare with the
   MatchFieldName in a credential to determine if the credential matches
   this filter entry.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         MatchFieldValue
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the value to be matched by the
                   MatchFieldName.
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      SYNTAX       string
      VALUE        NB: If the CredentialFilterEntry corresponds to a
                   DistinguishedName, this value in the CIM class is
                   represented by an ordinary string value.  However, an
                   implementation must convert this string to a DER-
                   encoded string before matching against the values
                   extracted from credentials at runtime.
   A wildcard mechanism may be used for MatchFieldNames that contain
   character strings.  The MatchFieldValue may contain a wildcard
   character, ’*’, in the pattern match specification.  For example, if
   the MatchFieldName is "subjectName", then a MatchFieldValue of
   "cn=*,ou=engineering,o=foo,c=be" will successfully match a
   certificate whose subject attribute is "cn=Jane
   Doe,ou=engineering,o=foo,c=be".  The wildcard character can be used
   to represent 0 or more characters as would be displayed to the user
   (i.e., a wildcard pattern match operates on displayable character
   boundaries).
5.3.3. The Property CredentialType
   The property CredentialType specifies the particular type of
   credential that is being matched.  The property is defined as
   follows:
      NAME         CredentialType
      DESCRIPTION  Defines the type of IKE credentials.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        1 - X.509 Certificate
                   2 - Kerberos Ticket
5.4. The Class IPSOFilterEntry
   The class IPSOFilterEntry is used to match traffic based on the IP
   Security Options [IPSO] header values (ClassificationLevel and
   ProtectionAuthority) as defined in RFC 1108.  This type of filter
   entry is used to adjust the IPsec encryption level according to the
   IPSO classification of the traffic (e.g., secret, confidential,
   restricted, etc.)  The class definition for IPSOFilterEntry is as
   follows:
      NAME         IPSOFilterEntry
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the a match filter based on IP Security
                   Options.
      DERIVED FROM FilterEntryBase (see [CIMNETWORK])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
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      PROPERTIES   Name (from FilterEntryBase)
                   IsNegated (from FilterEntryBase)
                   MatchConditionType
                   MatchConditionValue
5.4.1. The Property MatchConditionType
   The property MatchConditionType specifies the IPSO header field that
   will be matched (e.g., traffic classification level or protection
   authority).  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         MatchConditionType
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the IPSO header field to be matched.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        1 - ClassificationLevel
                   2 - ProtectionAuthority
5.4.2. The Property MatchConditionValue
   The property MatchConditionValue specifies the value of the IPSO
   header field to be matched against.  The property is defined as
   follows:
      NAME         MatchConditionValue
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the value of the IPSO header field to be
                   matched against.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        The values MUST be one of values listed in RFC 1108
                   (or any further IANA Assigned Numbers document).
                   Some examples for ClassificationLevel are:
                   61 - TopSecret
                   90 - Secret
                   150 - Confidential
                   171 - Unclassified
                   For ProtectionAuthority, some examples are:
                   0 - GENSER
                   1 - SIOP-ESI
                   2 - SCI
                   3 - NSA
                   4 - DOE
5.5. The Class PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry
   The class PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry defines filters used to match ID
   payload values from the IKE protocol exchange.
   PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry permits the specification of certain ID
   payload values such as "*@example.com" or "192.0.2.0/24".
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   Obviously this filter applies only to IKERules when acting as a
   responder.  Moreover, this filter can be applied immediately in the
   case of aggressive mode but its application is to be delayed in the
   case of main mode.  The class definition for PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry
   is as follows:
      NAME         PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies a match filter based on IKE identity.
      DERIVED FROM FilterEntryBase (see [CIMNETWORK])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Name (from FilterEntryBase)
                   IsNegated (from FilterEntryBase)
                   MatchIdentityType
                   MatchIdentityValue
5.5.1. The Property MatchIdentityType
   The property MatchIdentityType specifies the type of identity
   provided by the peer in the ID payload.  The property is defined as
   follows:
      NAME         MatchIdentityType
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the ID payload type.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Consult [DOI] for valid values.
   5.5.2. The Property MatchIdentityValue
   The property MatchIdentityValue specifies the filter value for
   comparison with the ID payload, e.g., "*@example.com".  The property
   is defined as follows:
      NAME         MatchIdentityValue
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the ID payload value.
      SYNTAX       string
      VALUE        NB: The syntax may need to be converted for
                   comparison.  If the PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry type is
                   a DistinguishedName, the name in the
                   MatchIdentityValue property is represented by an
                   ordinary string value, but this value must be
                   converted into a DER-encoded string before matching
                   against the values extracted from IKE ID payloads at
                   runtime.  The same applies to IPv4 & IPv6 addresses.
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   Different wildcard mechanisms can be used depending on the ID
   payload:
   -  a MatchIdentityValue of "*@example.com" will match a user FQDN ID
      payload of "JDOE@EXAMPLE.COM".
   -  a MatchIdentityValue of "*.example.com" will match a FQDN ID
      payload of "WWW.EXAMPLE.COM".
   -  a MatchIdentityValue of "cn=*,ou=engineering,o=company,c=us" will
      match a DER DN ID payload of "cn=John
      Doe,ou=engineering,o=company,c=us".
   -  a MatchIdentityValue of "193.190.125.0/24" will match an IPv4
      address ID payload of 193.190.125.10.
   -  a MatchIdentityValue of "193.190.125.*" will also match an IPv4
      address ID payload of 193.190.125.10.
   The above wildcard mechanisms MUST be supported for all ID payloads
   supported by the local IKE entity.  The character ’*’ replaces 0 or
   multiple instances of any character as restricted by the type
   specified by MatchIdentityType.
5.6. The Association Class FilterOfSACondition
   The class FilterOfSACondition associates an SACondition with the
   filter specifications (FilterList) that make up the condition.  The
   class definition for FilterOfSACondition is as follows:
      NAME         FilterOfSACondition
      DESCRIPTION  Associates a condition with the filter list that
                   makes up the individual condition elements.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref FilterList[1..1]]
                   Dependent [ref SACondition[0..n]]
5.6.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to a FilterList instance.  The [1..1] cardinality
   indicates that an SACondition instance MUST be associated with one
   and only one FilterList instance.
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5.6.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to an SACondition instance.  The [0..n] cardinality
   indicates that a FilterList instance may be associated with zero or
   more SACondition instances.
5.7. The Association Class AcceptCredentialFrom
   The class AcceptCredentialFrom specifies which credential management
   services (e.g., a CertificateAuthority or a Kerberos service) are to
   be trusted to certify peer credentials.  This is used to assure that
   the credential being matched in the CredentialFilterEntry is a valid
   credential that has been supplied by an approved
   CredentialManagementService.  If a CredentialManagementService is
   specified and a corresponding CredentialFilterEntry is used, but the
   credential supplied by the peer is not certified by that
   CredentialManagementService (or one of the
   CredentialManagementServices in its trust hierarchy), the
   CredentialFilterEntry is deemed not to match.  If a credential is
   certified by a CredentialManagementService in the
   AcceptCredentialsFrom list of services, but there is no
   CredentialFilterEntry, this is considered equivalent to a
   CredentialFilterEntry that matches all credentials from those
   services.
   The class definition for AcceptCredentialFrom is as follows:
      NAME         AcceptCredentialFrom
      DESCRIPTION  Associates a condition with the credential management
                   services to be trusted.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref CredentialManagementService[0..n]]
                   Dependent [ref SACondition[0..n]]
5.7.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to a CredentialManagementService instance.  The
   [0..n] cardinality indicates that an SACondition instance may be
   associated with zero or more CredentialManagementService instances.
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5.7.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to a SACondition instance.  The [0..n] cardinality indicates
   that a CredentialManagementService instance may be associated with
   zero or more SACondition instances.
6. Action Classes
   The action classes are used to model the different actions an IPsec
   device may take when the evaluation of the associated condition
   results in a match.
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                                +----------+
                                | SAAction |
                                +----------+
                                     ^
                                     |
                         +-----------+--------------+
                         |                          |
                         |               +---------------------+
                         |               | SaNegotiationAction |
                         |               +---------------------+
                         |                          ^
                         |                          |
                 +----------------+      +----------------------+*
                 | SAStaticAction |      | IKENegotiationAction |o----+
                 +----------------+      +----------------------+     |
                               ^                     ^                |
                               |                     |                |
                               |         +-----------+-------+        |
                               |         |                   |        |
       +-------------------+   |   +-------------+     +-----------+  |
       | IPsecBypassAction |---+   | IPsecAction |     | IKEAction |  |
       +-------------------+   |   +-------------+     +-----------+  |
                               |       ^                              |
      +--------------------+   |       |    +----------------------+  |
      | IPsecDiscardAction |---+       +----| IPsecTransportAction |  |
      +--------------------+   |       |    +----------------------+  |
                               |       |                              |
         +-----------------+   |       |    +-------------------+     |
         | IKERejectAction |---+       +----| IPsecTunnelAction |     |
         +-----------------+   |            +-------------------+     |
                               |                     *|               |
                               |       +--------------+               |
                               |       |                              |
   +-----------------------+   |       |       +--------------+n      |
   | PreconfiguredSAAction |---+       |(a)    | [SAProposal] |-------+
   +-----------------------+           |       +--------------+   (b)
      *|    ^                          |
       |    |                          |      *+-------------+
       |    |                          +-------| PeerGateway |
       |    |                                  +-------------+
       |    |  +-----------------------------+   |0..1  *w|
       |    +--| PreconfiguredTransportAction|   |        |(c)
       |    |  +-----------------------------+   |       1|
       |    |                                    |  +--------------+
       |    |  +---------------------------+ *   |  |    System    |
       |    +--| PreconfiguredTunnelAction |-----+  |  ([CIMCORE]) |
       |       +---------------------------+  (e)   +--------------+
       |
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       |   2..6+---------------+
       +-------| [SATransform] |
         (d)   +---------------+
      (a)  PeerGatewayForTunnel
      (b)  ContainedProposal
      (c)  HostedPeerGatewayInformation
      (d)  TransformOfPreconfiguredAction
      (e)  PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel
6.1. The Class SAAction
   The class SAAction is abstract and serves as the base class for IKE
   and IPsec actions.  It is used for aggregating different types of
   actions to IKE and IPsec rules.  The class definition for SAAction is
   as follows:
      NAME         SAAction
      DESCRIPTION  The base class for IKE and IPsec actions.
      DERIVED FROM PolicyAction (see [PCIM])
      ABSTRACT     TRUE
      PROPERTIES   PolicyActionName (from PolicyAction)
                   DoActionLogging
                   DoPacketLogging
6.1.1. The Property DoActionLogging
   The property DoActionLogging specifies whether a log message is to be
   generated when the action is performed.  This applies for
   SANegotiationActions with the meaning of logging a message when the
   negotiation is attempted (with the success or failure result).  This
   also applies for SAStaticAction only for PreconfiguredSAAction with
   the meaning of logging a message when the preconfigured SA is
   actually installed in the SADB.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         DoActionLogging
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the whether to log when the action is
                   performed.
      SYNTAX       boolean
      VALUE        true - a log message is to be generated when action
                   is performed.
                   false - no log message is to be generated when action
                   is performed.
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6.1.2. The Property DoPacketLogging
   The property DoPacketLogging specifies whether a log message is to be
   generated when the resulting security association is used to process
   the packet.  If the SANegotiationAction successfully executes and
   results in the creation of one or several security associations, or
   if the PreconfiguredSAAction executes, the value of DoPacketLogging
   SHOULD be propagated to an optional field of SADB.  This optional
   field should be used to decide whether a log message is to be
   generated when the SA is used to process a packet.  For
   SAStaticActions, a log message is to be generated when the
   IPsecBypassAction, IPsecDiscardAction, or IKERejectAction are
   executed.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         DoPacketLogging
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies whether to log when the resulting
                   security association is used to process the packet.
      SYNTAX       boolean
      VALUE        true - a log message is to be generated when the
                   resulting security association is used to process the
                   packet.
                   false - no log message is to be generated.
6.2. The Class SAStaticAction
   The class SAStaticAction is abstract and serves as the base class for
   IKE and IPsec actions that do not require any negotiation.  The class
   definition for SAStaticAction is as follows:
      NAME         SAStaticAction
      DESCRIPTION  The base class for IKE and IPsec actions that do not
                   require any negotiation.
      DERIVED FROM SAAction
      ABSTRACT     TRUE
      PROPERTIES   LifetimeSeconds
6.2.1. The Property LifetimeSeconds
   The property LifetimeSeconds specifies how long the security
   association derived from this action should be used.  The property is
   defined as follows:
      NAME         LifetimeSeconds
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the amount of time (in seconds) that a
                   security association derived from this action should
                   be used.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 64-bit integer
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      VALUE        A value of zero indicates that there is not a
                   lifetime associated with this action (i.e., infinite
                   lifetime).  A non-zero value is typically used in
                   conjunction with alternate SAActions performed when
                   there is a negotiation failure of some sort.
   Note: if the referenced SAStaticAction object is a
   PreconfiguredSAAction associated to several SATransforms, then the
   actual lifetime of the preconfigured SA will be the lesser of the
   value of this LifetimeSeconds property and of the value of the
   MaxLifetimeSeconds property of the associated SATransform.  If the
   value of this LifetimeSeconds property is zero, then there will be no
   lifetime associated to this SA.
   Note: while some SA negotiation protocols [IKE] can negotiate the
   lifetime as an arbitrary length field, the authors have assumed that
   a 64-bit integer will be sufficient.
   It is expected that most SAStaticAction instances will have their
   LifetimeSeconds properties set to zero (meaning no expiration of the
   resulting SA).
6.3. The Class IPsecBypassAction
   The class IPsecBypassAction is used when packets are allowed to be
   processed without applying IPsec encapsulation to them.  This is the
   same as stating that packets are allowed to flow in the clear.  The
   class definition for IPsecBypassAction is as follows:
      NAME         IPsecBypassAction
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies that packets are to be allowed to pass in
                   the clear.
      DERIVED FROM SAStaticAction
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
6.4. The Class IPsecDiscardAction
   The class IPsecDiscardAction is used when packets are to be
   discarded.  This is the same as stating that packets are to be
   denied.  The class definition for IPsecDiscardAction is as follows:
      NAME         IPsecDiscardAction
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies that packets are to be discarded.
      DERIVED FROM SAStaticAction
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
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6.5. The Class IKERejectAction
   The class IKERejectAction is used to prevent attempting an IKE
   negotiation with the peer(s).  The main use of this class is to
   prevent some denial of service attacks when acting as IKE responder.
   It goes beyond a plain discard of UDP/500 IKE packets because the
   SACondition can be based on specific PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry (when
   aggressive mode is used).  The class definition for IKERejectAction
   is as follows:
      NAME         IKERejectAction
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies that an IKE negotiation should not even be
                   attempted or continued.
      DERIVED FROM SAStaticAction
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
6.6. The Class PreconfiguredSAAction
   The class PreconfiguredSAAction is used to create a security
   association using preconfigured, hard-wired algorithms and keys.
   Notes:
   -  the SPI for a PreconfiguredSAAction is contained in the
      association, TransformOfPreconfiguredAction;
   -  the session key (if applicable) is contained in an instance of the
      class SharedSecret (see [CIMUSER]).  The session key is stored in
      the property Secret, the property protocol contains either "ESP-
      encrypt", "ESP-auth" or "AH", the property algorithm contains the
      algorithm used to protect the secret (can be "PLAINTEXT" if the
      IPsec entity has no secret storage), the value of property
      RemoteID is the concatenation of the remote IPsec peer IP address
      in dotted decimal, of the character "/", of "IN" (respectively
      "OUT") for inbound SA (respectively outbound SA), of the character
      "/", and of the hexadecimal representation of the SPI.
   Although the class is concrete, it MUST not be instantiated.  The
   class definition for PreconfiguredSAAction is as follows:
      NAME         PreconfiguredSAAction
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies preconfigured algorithm and keying
                   information for creation of a security association.
      DERIVED FROM SAStaticAction
      ABSTRACT     TRUE
      PROPERTIES   LifetimeKilobytes
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6.6.1. The Property LifetimeKilobytes
   The property LifetimeKilobytes specifies a traffic limit in kilobytes
   that can be consumed before the SA is deleted.  The property is
   defined as follows:
      NAME         LifetimeKilobytes
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the SA lifetime in kilobytes.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 64-bit integer
      VALUE        A value of zero indicates that there is not a
                   lifetime associated with this action (i.e., infinite
                   lifetime).  A non-zero value is used to indicate that
                   after this number of kilobytes has been consumed the
                   SA must be deleted from the SADB.
   Note: the actual lifetime of the preconfigured SA will be the lesser
   of the value of this LifetimeKilobytes property and of the value of
   the MaxLifetimeSeconds property of the associated SATransform.  If
   the value of this LifetimeKilobytes property is zero, then there will
   be no lifetime associated with this action.
   Note: while some SA negotiation protocols [IKE] can negotiate the
   lifetime as an arbitrary length field, the authors have assumed that
   a 64-bit integer will be sufficient.
   It is expected that most PreconfiguredSAAction instances will have
   their LifetimeKilobyte properties set to zero (meaning no expiration
   of the resulting SA).
6.7. The Class PreconfiguredTransportAction
   The class PreconfiguredTransportAction is used to create an IPsec
   transport-mode security association using preconfigured, hard-wired
   algorithms and keys.  The class definition for
   PreconfiguredTransportAction is as follows:
      NAME         PreconfiguredTransportAction
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies preconfigured algorithm and keying
                   information for creation of an IPsec transport
                   security association.
      DERIVED FROM PreconfiguredSAAction
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
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6.8. The Class PreconfiguredTunnelAction
   The class PreconfiguredTunnelAction is used to create an IPsec
   tunnel-mode security association using preconfigured, hard-wired
   algorithms and keys.  The class definition for PreconfiguredSAAction
   is as follows:
      NAME         PreconfiguredTunnelAction
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies preconfigured algorithm and keying
                   information for creation of an IPsec tunnel-mode
                   security association.
      DERIVED FROM PreconfiguredSAAction
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   DFHandling
6.8.1. The Property DFHandling
   The property DFHandling specifies how the Don’t Fragment (DF) bit of
   the internal IP header is to be handled during IPsec processing.  The
   property is defined as follows:
      NAME         DFHandling
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the processing of the DF bit.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        1 - Copy the DF bit from the internal IP header to
                   the external IP header.
                   2 - Set the DF bit of the external IP header to 1.
                   3 - Clear the DF bit of the external IP header to 0.
6.9. The Class SANegotiationAction
   The class SANegotiationAction specifies an action requesting security
   policy negotiation.
   This is an abstract class.  Currently, only one security policy
   negotiation protocol action is subclassed from SANegotiationAction:
   the IKENegotiationAction class.  It is nevertheless expected that
   other security policy negotiation protocols will exist and the
   negotiation actions of those new protocols would be modeled as a
   subclass of SANegotiationAction.
      NAME         SANegotiationAction
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies a negotiation action.
      DERIVED FROM SAAction
      ABSTRACT     TRUE
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6.10. The Class IKENegotiationAction
   The class IKENegotiationAction is abstract and serves as the base
   class for IKE and IPsec actions that result in an IKE negotiation.
   The class definition for IKENegotiationAction is as follows:
      NAME         IKENegotiationAction
      DESCRIPTION  A base class for IKE and IPsec actions that specifies
                   the parameters that are common for IKE phase 1 and
                   IKE phase 2 IPsec DOI negotiations.
      DERIVED FROM SANegotiationAction
      ABSTRACT     TRUE
      PROPERTIES   MinLifetimeSeconds
                   MinLifetimeKilobytes
                   IdleDurationSeconds
6.10.1. The Property MinLifetimeSeconds
   The property MinLifetimeSeconds specifies the minimum seconds in a
   lifetime that will be accepted from the peer.  MinLifetimeSeconds is
   used to prevent certain denial of service attacks where the peer
   requests an arbitrarily low lifetime value, causing renegotiations
   with expensive Diffie-Hellman operations.  The property is defined as
   follows:
      NAME         MinLifetimeSeconds
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the minimum seconds acceptable in a
                   lifetime.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 64-bit integer
      VALUE        A value of zero indicates that there is no minimum
                   value.  A non-zero value specifies the minimum
                   seconds lifetime.
   Note: while IKE can negotiate the lifetime as an arbitrary length
   field, the authors have assumed that a 64-bit integer will be
   sufficient.
6.10.2. The Property MinLifetimeKilobytes
   The property MinLifetimeKilobytes specifies the minimum kilobytes of
   a lifetime that will be accepted from the peer.  MinLifetimeKilobytes
   is used to prevent certain denial of service attacks, where the peer
   requests an arbitrarily low lifetime value, causing renegotiations
   with correspondingly expensive Diffie-Hellman operations.  Note that
   there has been considerable debate regarding the usefulness of
   applying kilobyte lifetimes to IKE phase 1 security associations, so
   it is likely that this property will only apply to the sub-class
   IPsecAction.  The property is defined as follows:
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      NAME         MinLifetimeKilobytes
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the minimum kilobytes acceptable in a
                   lifetime.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 64-bit integer
      VALUE        A value of zero indicates that there is no minimum
                   value.  A non-zero value specifies the minimum
                   kilobytes lifetime.
   Note: While IKE can negotiate the lifetime as an arbitrary length
   field, the authors have assumed that a 64-bit integer will be
   sufficient.
6.10.3. The Property IdleDurationSeconds
   The property IdleDurationSeconds specifies how many seconds a
   security association may remain idle (i.e., no traffic protected
   using the security association) before it is deleted.  The property
   is defined as follows:
      NAME         IdleDurationSeconds
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies how long, in seconds, a security
                   association may remain unused before it is deleted.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 64-bit integer
      VALUE        A value of zero indicates that idle detection should
                   not be used for the security association (only the
                   seconds and kilobyte lifetimes will be used).  Any
                   non-zero value indicates the number of seconds the
                   security association may remain unused.
6.11. The Class IPsecAction
   The class IPsecAction serves as the base class for IPsec transport
   and tunnel actions.  It specifies the parameters used for an IKE
   phase 2 IPsec DOI negotiation.  The class definition for IPsecAction
   is as follows:
      NAME         IPsecAction
      DESCRIPTION  A base class for IPsec transport and tunnel actions
                   that specifies the parameters for IKE phase 2 IPsec
                   DOI negotiations.
      DERIVED FROM IKENegotiationAction
      ABSTRACT     TRUE
      PROPERTIES   UsePFS
                   UseIKEGroup
                   GroupId
                   Granularity
                   VendorID
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6.11.1. The Property UsePFS
   The property UsePFS specifies whether or not perfect forward secrecy
   should be used when refreshing keys.  The property is defined as
   follows:
      NAME         UsePFS
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the whether or not to use PFS when
                   refreshing keys.
      SYNTAX       boolean
      VALUE        A value of true indicates that PFS should be used.  A
                   value of false indicates that PFS should not be used.
6.11.2. The Property UseIKEGroup
   The property UseIKEGroup specifies whether or not phase 2 should use
   the same key exchange group as was used in phase 1.  UseIKEGroup is
   ignored if UsePFS is false.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         UseIKEGroup
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies whether or not to use the same GroupId for
                   phase 2 as was used in phase 1.  If UsePFS is false,
                   then UseIKEGroup is ignored.
      SYNTAX       boolean
      VALUE        A value of true indicates that the phase 2 GroupId
                   should be the same as phase 1.  A value of false
                   indicates that the property GroupId will contain the
                   key exchange group to use for phase 2.
6.11.3. The Property GroupId
   The property GroupId specifies the key exchange group to use for
   phase 2.  GroupId is ignored if (1) the property UsePFS is false, or
   (2) the property UsePFS is true and the property UseIKEGroup is true.
   If the GroupID number is from the vendor-specific range (32768-
   65535), the property VendorID qualifies the group number.  The
   property is defined as follows:
      NAME         GroupId
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the key exchange group to use for phase 2
                   when the property UsePFS is true and the property
                   UseIKEGroup is false.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Consult [IKE] for valid values.
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6.11.4. The Property Granularity
   The property Granularity specifies how the selector for the security
   association should be derived from the traffic that triggered the
   negotiation.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         Granularity
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies how the proposed selector for the
                   security association will be created.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        1 - subnet: the source and destination subnet masks
                   of the filter entry are used.
                   2 - address: only the source and destination IP
                   addresses of the triggering packet are used.
                   3 - protocol: the source and destination IP addresses
                   and the IP protocol of the triggering packet are
                   used.
                   4 - port: the source and destination IP addresses and
                   the IP protocol and the source and destination layer
                   4 ports of the triggering packet are used.
6.11.5. The Property VendorID
   The property VendorID is used together with the property GroupID
   (when it is in the vendor-specific range) to identify the key
   exchange group.  VendorID is ignored unless UsePFS is true and
   UseIKEGroup is false and GroupID is in the vendor-specific range
   (32768-65535).  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         VendorID
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the IKE Vendor ID.
      SYNTAX       string
6.12. The Class IPsecTransportAction
   The class IPsecTransportAction is a subclass of IPsecAction that is
   used to specify use of an IPsec transport-mode security association.
   The class definition for IPsecTransportAction is as follows:
      NAME         IPsecTransportAction
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies that an IPsec transport-mode security
                   association should be negotiated.
      DERIVED FROM IPsecAction
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
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6.13. The Class IPsecTunnelAction
   The class IPsecTunnelAction is a subclass of IPsecAction that is used
   to specify use of an IPsec tunnel-mode security association.  The
   class definition for IPsecTunnelAction is as follows:
      NAME         IPsecTunnelAction
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies that an IPsec tunnel-mode security
                   association should be negotiated.
      DERIVED FROM IPsecAction
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   DFHandling
6.13.1. The Property DFHandling
   The property DFHandling specifies how the tunnel should manage the
   Don’t Fragment (DF) bit.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         DFHandling
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies how to process the DF bit.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        1 - Copy the DF bit from the internal IP header to
                   the external IP header.
                   2 - Set the DF bit of the external IP header to 1.
                   3 - Clear the DF bit of the external IP header to 0.
6.14. The Class IKEAction
   The class IKEAction specifies the parameters that are to be used for
   IKE phase 1 negotiation.  The class definition for IKEAction is as
   follows:
      NAME         IKEAction
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the IKE phase 1 negotiation parameters.
      DERIVED FROM IKENegotiationAction
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   ExchangeMode
                   UseIKEIdentityType
                   VendorID
                   AggressiveModeGroupId
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6.14.1. The Property ExchangeMode
   The property ExchangeMode specifies which IKE mode should be used for
   IKE phase 1 negotiations.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         ExchangeMode
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the IKE negotiation mode for phase 1.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        1 - base mode
                   2 - main mode
                   4 - aggressive mode
6.14.2. The Property UseIKEIdentityType
   The property UseIKEIdentityType specifies what IKE identity type
   should be used when negotiating with the peer.  This information is
   used in conjunction with the IKE identities available on the system
   and the IdentityContexts of the matching IKERule.  The property is
   defined as follows:
      NAME         UseIKEIdentityType
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the IKE identity to use during negotiation.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Consult [DOI] for valid values.
6.14.3. The Property VendorID
   The property VendorID specifies the value to be used in the Vendor ID
   payload.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         VendorID
      DESCRIPTION  Vendor ID Payload.
      SYNTAX       string
      VALUE        A value of NULL means that Vendor ID payload will be
                   neither generated nor accepted.  A non-NULL value
                   means that a Vendor ID payload will be generated
                   (when acting as an initiator) or is expected (when
                   acting as a responder).
6.14.4. The Property AggressiveModeGroupId
   The property AggressiveModeGroupId specifies which group ID is to be
   used in the first packets of the phase 1 negotiation.  This property
   is ignored unless the property ExchangeMode is set to 4 (aggressive
   mode).  If the AggressiveModeGroupID number is from the vendor-
   specific range (32768-65535), the property VendorID qualifies the
   group number.  The property is defined as follows:
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      NAME         AggressiveModeGroupId
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the group ID to be used for aggressive
                   mode.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
6.15. The Class PeerGateway
   The class PeerGateway specifies the security gateway with which the
   IKE services negotiates.  The class definition for PeerGateway is as
   follows:
      NAME         PeerGateway
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the security gateway with which to
                   negotiate.
      DERIVED FROM LogicalElement (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Name
                   PeerIdentityType
                   PeerIdentity
   Note: The class PeerIdentityEntry contains more information about the
   peer (namely its IP address).
6.15.1. The Property Name
   The property Name specifies a user-friendly name for this security
   gateway.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         Name
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies a user-friendly name for this security
                   gateway.
      SYNTAX       string
6.15.2. The Property PeerIdentityType
   The property PeerIdentityType specifies the IKE identity type of the
   security gateway.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         PeerIdentityType
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the IKE identity type of the security
                   gateway.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Consult [DOI] for valid values.
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6.15.3. The Property PeerIdentity
   The property PeerIdentity specifies the IKE identity value of the
   security gateway.  Based upon the storage chosen for the task-
   specific mapping of the information model, a conversion may be needed
   from the stored representation of the PeerIdentity string to the real
   value used in the ID payload (e.g., IP address is to be converted
   from a dotted decimal string into 4 bytes).  The property is defined
   as follows:
      NAME         PeerIdentity
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the IKE identity value of the security
                   gateway.
      SYNTAX       string
6.16. The Association Class PeerGatewayForTunnel
   The class PeerGatewayForTunnel associates IPsecTunnelActions with an
   ordered list of PeerGateways.  The class definition for
   PeerGatewayForTunnel is as follows:
      NAME         PeerGatewayForTunnel
      DESCRIPTION  Associates IPsecTunnelActions with an ordered list of
                   PeerGateways.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref PeerGateway[0..n]]
                   Dependent [ref IPsecTunnelAction[0..n]]
                   SequenceNumber
6.16.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to a PeerGateway instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that an IPsecTunnelAction instance may be
   associated with zero or more PeerGateway instances.
   Note: The cardinality 0 has a specific meaning:
   -  when the IKE service acts as a responder, this means that the IKE
      service will accept phase 1 negotiation with any other security
      gateway;
   -  when the IKE service acts as an initiator, this means that the IKE
      service will use the destination IP address (of the IP packets
      which triggered the SARule) as the IP address of the peer IKE
      entity.
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6.16.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to an IPsecTunnelAction instance.  The [0..n] cardinality
   indicates that a PeerGateway instance may be associated with zero or
   more IPsecTunnelAction instances.
6.16.3. The Property SequenceNumber
   The property SequenceNumber specifies the ordering to be used when
   evaluating PeerGateway instances for a given IPsecTunnelAction.  The
   property is defined as follows:
      NAME         SequenceNumber
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the order of evaluation for PeerGateways.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Lower values are evaluated first.
6.17. The Aggregation Class ContainedProposal
   The class ContainedProposal associates an ordered list of SAProposals
   with the IKENegotiationAction that aggregates it.  If the referenced
   IKENegotiationAction object is an IKEAction, then the referenced
   SAProposal object(s) must be IKEProposal(s).  If the referenced
   IKENegotiationAction object is an IPsecTransportAction or an
   IPsecTunnelAction, then the referenced SAProposal object(s) must be
   IPsecProposal(s).  The class definition for ContainedProposal is as
   follows:
       NAME         ContainedProposal
       DESCRIPTION  Associates an ordered list of SAProposals with an
                    IKENegotiationAction.
       DERIVED FROM PolicyComponent (see [PCIM])
       ABSTRACT     FALSE
       PROPERTIES   GroupComponent[ref IKENegotiationAction[0..n]]
                    PartComponent[ref SAProposal[1..n]]
                    SequenceNumber
6.17.1. The Reference GroupComponent
   -  The property GroupComponent is inherited from PolicyComponent and
      is overridden to refer to an IKENegotiationAction instance.  The
      [0..n] cardinality indicates that an SAProposal instance may be
      associated with zero or more IKENegotiationAction instances.
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6.17.2. The Reference PartComponent
   The property PartComponent is inherited from PolicyComponent and is
   overridden to refer to an SAProposal instance.  The [1..n]
   cardinality indicates that an IKENegotiationAction instance MUST be
   associated with at least one SAProposal instance.
6.17.3. The Property SequenceNumber
   The property SequenceNumber specifies the order of preference for the
   SAProposals.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         SequenceNumber
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the preference order for the SAProposals.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Lower-valued proposals are preferred over proposals
                   with higher values.  For ContainedProposals that
                   reference the same IKENegotiationAction,
                   SequenceNumber values must be unique.
6.18. The Association Class HostedPeerGatewayInformation
   The class HostedPeerGatewayInformation weakly associates a
   PeerGateway with a System.  The class definition for
   HostedPeerGatewayInformation is as follows:
      NAME         HostedPeerGatewayInformation
      DESCRIPTION  Weakly associates a PeerGateway with a System.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref System[1..1]]
                   Dependent [ref PeerGateway[0..n] [weak]]
6.18.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to a System instance.  The [1..1] cardinality
   indicates that a PeerGateway instance MUST be associated with one and
   only one System instance.
6.18.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to a PeerGateway instance.  The [0..n] cardinality indicates
   that a System instance may be associated with zero or more
   PeerGateway instances.
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6.19. The Association Class TransformOfPreconfiguredAction
   The class TransformOfPreconfiguredAction associates a
   PreconfiguredSAAction with two, four or six SATransforms that will be
   applied to the inbound and outbound traffic.  The order of
   application of the SATransforms is implicitly defined in [IPSEC].
   The class definition for TransformOfPreconfiguredAction is as
   follows:
      NAME         TransformOfPreconfiguredAction
      DESCRIPTION  Associates a PreconfiguredSAAction with from one to
                   three SATransforms.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent[ref SATransform[2..6]]
                   Dependent[ref PreconfiguredSAAction[0..n]]
                   SPI
                   Direction
6.19.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to an SATransform instance.  The [2..6]
   cardinality indicates that a PreconfiguredSAAction instance may be
   associated with two to six SATransform instances.
6.19.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to a PreconfiguredSAAction instance.  The [0..n] cardinality
   indicates that a SATransform instance may be associated with zero or
   more PreconfiguredSAAction instances.
6.19.3. The Property SPI
   The property SPI specifies the SPI to be used by the pre-configured
   action for the associated transform.  The property is defined as
   follows:
      NAME         SPI
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the SPI to be used with the SATransform.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 32-bit integer
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6.19.4. The Property Direction
   The property Direction specifies whether the SPI property is for
   inbound or outbound traffic.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         Direction
      DESCRIPTION Specifies whether the SA is for inbound or outbound
                  traffic.
      SYNTAX      unsigned 8-bit integer
      VALUE       1 - this SA is for inbound traffic
                  2 - this SA is for outbound traffic
6.20 The Association Class PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel
   The class PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel associates zero or one
   PeerGateways with multiple PreconfiguredTunnelActions.  The class
   definition for PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel is as follows:
      NAME         PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel
      DESCRIPTION  Associates a PeerGateway with multiple
                   PreconfiguredTunnelActions.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent[ref PeerGateway[0..1]]
                   Dependent[ref PreconfiguredTunnelAction[0..n]]
6.20.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to a PeerGateway instance.  The [0..1]
   cardinality indicates that a PreconfiguredTunnelAction instance may
   be associated with one PeerGteway instance.
6.20.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to a PreconfiguredTunnelAction instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that a PeerGateway instance may be associated
   with zero or more PreconfiguredSAAction instances.
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7. Proposal and Transform Classes
   The proposal and transform classes model the proposal settings an
   IPsec device will use during IKE phase 1 and 2 negotiations.
                        +--------------+*w     1+--------------+
                        | [SAProposal] |--------|   System     |
                        +--------------+  (a)   | ([CIMCORE])  |
                               ^                +--------------+
                               |                        |1
                    +----------------------+            |
                    |                      |            |
             +-------------+       +---------------+    |
             | IKEProposal |       | IPsecProposal |    |
             +-------------+       +---------------+    |
                                          *o            |
                                           |(b)         |(c)
                                          n|            |
                                   +---------------+*w  |
                                   | [SATransform] |----+
                                   +---------------+
                                           ^
                                           |
          +--------------------+-----------+---------+
          |                    |                     |
   +-------------+     +--------------+     +----------------+
   | AHTransform |     | ESPTransform |     |IPCOMPTransform |
   +-------------+     +--------------+     +----------------+
      (a)  SAProposalInSystem
      (b)  ContainedTransform
      (c)  SATransformInSystem
7.1. The Abstract Class SAProposal
   The abstract class SAProposal serves as the base class for the IKE
   and IPsec proposal classes.  It specifies the parameters that are
   common to the two proposal types.  The class definition for
   SAProposal is as follows:
      NAME         SAProposal
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the common proposal parameters for IKE and
                   IPsec security association negotiation.
      DERIVED FROM Policy ([PCIM])
      ABSTRACT     TRUE
      PROPERTIES   Name
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7.1.1. The Property Name
   The property Name specifies a user-friendly name for the SAProposal.
   The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         Name
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies a user-friendly name for this proposal.
      SYNTAX       string
7.2. The Class IKEProposal
   The class IKEProposal specifies the proposal parameters necessary to
   drive an IKE security association negotiation.  The class definition
   for IKEProposal is as follows:
      NAME         IKEProposal
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposal parameters for IKE security
                   association negotiation.
      DERIVED FROM SAProposal
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   CipherAlgorithm
                   HashAlgorithm
                   PRFAlgorithm
                   GroupId
                   AuthenticationMethod
                   MaxLifetimeSeconds
                   MaxLifetimeKilobytes
                   VendorID
7.2.1. The Property CipherAlgorithm
   The property CipherAlgorithm specifies the proposed phase 1 security
   association encryption algorithm.  The property is defined as
   follows:
      NAME         CipherAlgorithm
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposed encryption algorithm for the
                   phase 1 security association.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Consult [IKE] for valid values.
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7.2.2. The Property HashAlgorithm
   The property HashAlgorithm specifies the proposed phase 1 security
   association hash algorithm.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         HashAlgorithm
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposed hash algorithm for the phase 1
                   security association.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Consult [IKE] for valid values.
7.2.3. The Property PRFAlgorithm
   The property PRFAlgorithm specifies the proposed phase 1 security
   association pseudo-random function.  The property is defined as
   follows:
      NAME         PRFAlgorithm
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposed pseudo-random function for the
                   phase 1 security association.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Currently none defined in [IKE], if [IKE, DOI] are
                   extended, then the values of [IKE, DOI] are to be
                   used for values of PRFAlgorithm.
7.2.4. The Property GroupId
   The property GroupId specifies the proposed phase 1 security
   association key exchange group.  This property is ignored for all
   aggressive mode exchanges.  If the GroupID number is from the
   vendor-specific range (32768-65535), the property VendorID qualifies
   the group number.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         GroupId
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposed key exchange group for the
                   phase 1 security association.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Consult [IKE] for valid values.
   Note: The value of this property is to be ignored in aggressive mode.
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7.2.5. The Property AuthenticationMethod
   The property AuthenticationMethod specifies the proposed phase 1
   authentication method.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         AuthenticationMethod
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposed authentication method for the
                   phase 1 security association.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        0 - a special value that indicates that this
                   particular proposal should be repeated once for each
                   authentication method that corresponds to the
                   credentials installed on the machine.  For example,
                   if the system has a pre-shared key and a certificate,
                   a proposal list could be constructed that includes a
                   proposal that specifies a pre-shared key and
                   proposals for any of the public-key authentication
                   methods.  Consult [IKE] for valid values.
7.2.6. The Property MaxLifetimeSeconds
   The property MaxLifetimeSeconds specifies the proposed maximum time,
   in seconds, that a security association will remain valid after its
   creation.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         MaxLifetimeSeconds
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposed maximum time that a
                   security association will remain valid.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 64-bit integer
      VALUE        A value of zero indicates that the default of 8
                   hours be used.  A non-zero value indicates the
                   maximum seconds lifetime.
   Note: While IKE can negotiate the lifetime as an arbitrary length
   field, the authors have assumed that a 64-bit integer will be
   sufficient.
7.2.7. The Property MaxLifetimeKilobytes
   The property MaxLifetimeKilobytes specifies the proposed maximum
   kilobyte lifetime that a security association will remain valid after
   its creation.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         MaxLifetimeKilobytes
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposed maximum kilobyte lifetime
                   that a security association will remain valid.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 64-bit integer
Jason, et al.               Standards Track                    [Page 53]
RFC 3585            IPsec Configuration Policy Model         August 2003
      VALUE        A value of zero indicates that there should be no
                   maximum kilobyte lifetime.  A non-zero value
                   specifies the desired kilobyte lifetime.
   Note: While IKE can negotiate the lifetime as an arbitrary length
   field, the authors have assumed that a 64-bit integer will be
   sufficient.
7.2.8. The Property VendorID
   The property VendorID further qualifies the key exchange group.  The
   property is ignored unless the exchange is not in aggressive mode and
   the property GroupID is in the vendor-specific range.  The property
   is defined as follows:
      NAME         VendorID
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the Vendor ID to further qualify the key
                   exchange group.
      SYNTAX       string
7.3. The Class IPsecProposal
   The class IPsecProposal adds no new properties, but inherits proposal
   properties from SAProposal, as well as aggregating the security
   association transforms necessary for building an IPsec proposal (see
   the aggregation class ContainedTransform).  The class definition for
   IPsecProposal is as follows:
      NAME         IPsecProposal
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposal parameters for IPsec security
                   association negotiation.
      DERIVED FROM SAProposal
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
7.4. The Abstract Class SATransform
   The abstract class SATransform serves as the base class for the IPsec
   transforms that can be used to compose an IPsec proposal or to be
   used as a pre-configured action.  The class definition for
   SATransform is as follows:
      NAME         SATransform
      DESCRIPTION  Base class for the different IPsec transforms.
      ABSTRACT     TRUE
      PROPERTIES   CommonName (from Policy)
                   VendorID
                   MaxLifetimeSeconds
                   MaxLifetimeKilobytes
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7.4.1. The Property CommonName
   The property CommonName is inherited from Policy [PCIM] and specifies
   a user-friendly name for the SATransform.  The property is defined as
   follows:
      NAME         CommonName
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies a user-friendly name for this Policy-
                   related object.
      SYNTAX       string
7.4.2. The Property VendorID
   The property VendorID specifies the vendor ID for vendor-defined
   transforms.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         VendorID
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the vendor ID for vendor-defined
                   transforms.
      SYNTAX       string
      VALUE        An empty VendorID string indicates that the transform
                   is a standard one.
7.4.3. The Property MaxLifetimeSeconds
   The property MaxLifetimeSeconds specifies the proposed maximum time,
   in seconds, that a security association will remain valid after its
   creation.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         MaxLifetimeSeconds
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposed maximum time that a
                   security association will remain valid.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 64-bit integer
      VALUE        A value of zero indicates that the default of 8 hours
                   be used.  A non-zero value indicates the maximum
                   seconds lifetime.
   Note: While IKE can negotiate the lifetime as an arbitrary length
   field, the authors have assumed that a 64-bit integer will be
   sufficient.
7.4.4. The Property MaxLifetimeKilobytes
   The property MaxLifetimeKilobytes specifies the proposed maximum
   kilobyte lifetime that a security association will remain valid after
   its creation.  The property is defined as follows:
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      NAME         MaxLifetimeKilobytes
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposed maximum kilobyte lifetime
                   that a security association will remain valid.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 64-bit integer
      VALUE        A value of zero indicates that there should be no
                   maximum kilobyte lifetime.  A non-zero value
                   specifies the desired kilobyte lifetime.
   Note: While IKE can negotiate the lifetime as an arbitrary length
   field, the authors have assumed that a 64-bit integer will be
   sufficient.
7.5. The Class AHTransform
   The class AHTransform specifies the AH algorithm to propose during
   IPsec security association negotiation.  The class definition for
   AHTransform is as follows:
      NAME         AHTransform
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposed AH algorithm.
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   AHTransformId
                   UseReplayPrevention
                   ReplayPreventionWindowSize
7.5.1. The Property AHTransformId
   The property AHTransformId specifies the transform ID of the AH
   algorithm.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         AHTransformId
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the transform ID of the AH algorithm.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Consult [DOI] for valid values.
7.5.2. The Property UseReplayPrevention
   The property UseReplayPrevention specifies whether replay prevention
   detection is to be used.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         UseReplayPrevention
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies whether to enable replay prevention
                   detection.
      SYNTAX       boolean
      VALUE        true - replay prevention detection is enabled.
                   false - replay prevention detection is disabled.
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7.5.3. The Property ReplayPreventionWindowSize
   The property ReplayPreventionWindowSize specifies, in bits, the
   length of the sliding window used by the replay prevention detection
   mechanism.  The value of this property is meaningless if
   UseReplayPrevention is false.  It is assumed that the window size
   will be power of 2.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         ReplayPreventionWindowSize
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the length of the window used by the replay
                   prevention detection mechanism.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 32-bit integer
7.6. The Class ESPTransform
   The class ESPTransform specifies the ESP algorithms to propose
   during IPsec security association negotiation.  The class definition
   for ESPTransform is as follows:
      NAME         ESPTransform
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposed ESP algorithms.
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   IntegrityTransformId
                   CipherTransformId
                   CipherKeyLength
                   CipherKeyRounds
                   UseReplayPrevention
                   ReplayPreventionWindowSize
7.6.1. The Property IntegrityTransformId
   The property IntegrityTransformId specifies the transform ID of the
   ESP integrity algorithm.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         IntegrityTransformId
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the transform ID of the ESP integrity
                   algorithm.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Consult [DOI] for valid values.
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7.6.2. The Property CipherTransformId
   The property CipherTransformId specifies the transform ID of the ESP
   encryption algorithm.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         CipherTransformId
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the transform ID of the ESP encryption
                   algorithm.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Consult [DOI] for valid values.
7.6.3. The Property CipherKeyLength
   The property CipherKeyLength specifies, in bits, the key length for
   the ESP encryption algorithm.  For encryption algorithms that use a
   fixed-length keys, this value is ignored.  The property is defined as
   follows:
      NAME         CipherKeyLength
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the ESP encryption key length in bits.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
7.6.4. The Property CipherKeyRounds
   The property CipherKeyRounds specifies the number of key rounds for
   the ESP encryption algorithm.  For encryption algorithms that use
   fixed number of key rounds, this value is ignored.  The property is
   defined as follows:
      NAME         CipherKeyRounds
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the number of key rounds for the ESP
                   encryption algorithm.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Currently, key rounds are not defined for any ESP
                   encryption algorithms.
7.6.5. The Property UseReplayPrevention
   The property UseReplayPrevention specifies whether replay prevention
   detection is to be used.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         UseReplayPrevention
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies whether to enable replay prevention
                   detection.
      SYNTAX       boolean
      VALUE        true - replay prevention detection is enabled.
                   false - replay prevention detection is disabled.
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7.6.6. The Property ReplayPreventionWindowSize
   The property ReplayPreventionWindowSize specifies, in bits, the
   length of the sliding window used by the replay prevention detection
   mechanism.  The value of this property is meaningless if
   UseReplayPrevention is false.  It is assumed that the window size
   will be power of 2.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         ReplayPreventionWindowSize
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the length of the window used by the replay
                   prevention detection mechanism.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 32-bit integer
7.7. The Class IPCOMPTransform
   The class IPCOMPTransform specifies the IP compression (IPCOMP)
   algorithm to propose during IPsec security association negotiation.
   The class definition for IPCOMPTransform is as follows:
      NAME         IPCOMPTransform
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the proposed IPCOMP algorithm.
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Algorithm
                   DictionarySize
                   PrivateAlgorithm
7.7.1. The Property Algorithm
   The property Algorithm specifies the transform ID of the IPCOMP
   compression algorithm.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         Algorithm
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the transform ID of the IPCOMP compression
                   algorithm.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        1 - OUI: a vendor specific algorithm is used and
                   specified in the property PrivateAlgorithm.  Consult
                   [DOI] for other valid values.
7.7.2. The Property DictionarySize
   The property DictionarySize specifies the log2 maximum size of the
   dictionary for the compression algorithm.  For compression algorithms
   that have pre-defined dictionary sizes, this value is ignored.  The
   property is defined as follows:
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      NAME         DictionarySize
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the log2 maximum size of the dictionary.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
7.7.3. The Property PrivateAlgorithm
   The property PrivateAlgorithm specifies a private vendor-specific
   compression algorithm.  This value is only used when the property
   Algorithm is 1 (OUI).  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         PrivateAlgorithm
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies a private vendor-specific compression
                   algorithm.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 32-bit integer
7.8. The Association Class SAProposalInSystem
   The class SAProposalInSystem weakly associates SAProposals with a
   System.  The class definition for SAProposalInSystem is as follows:
      NAME         SAProposalInSystem
      DESCRIPTION  Weakly associates SAProposals with a System.
      DERIVED FROM PolicyInSystem (see [PCIM])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent[ref System [1..1]]
                   Dependent[ref SAProposal[0..n] [weak]]
7.8.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from the PolicyInSystem and is
   overridden to refer to a System instance.  The [1..1] cardinality
   indicates that an SAProposal instance MUST be associated with one and
   only one System instance.
7.8.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from PolicyInSystem and is
   overridden to refer to an SAProposal instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that a System instance may be associated with
   zero or more SAProposal instances.
7.9. The Aggregation Class ContainedTransform
   The class ContainedTransform associates an IPsecProposal with the set
   of SATransforms that make up the proposal.  If multiple transforms of
   the same type are in a proposal, then they are to be logically ORed
   and the order of preference is dictated by the SequenceNumber
   property.  Sets of transforms of different types are logically ANDed.
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   For example, if the ordered proposal list were
      ESP = { (HMAC-MD5, 3DES), (HMAC-MD5, DES) }
      AH  = { MD5, SHA-1 }
   then the one sending the proposal would want the other side to pick
   one from the ESP transform (preferably (HMAC-MD5, 3DES)) list AND one
   from the AH transform list (preferably MD5).
   The class definition for ContainedTransform is as follows:
      NAME         ContainedTransform
      DESCRIPTION  Associates an IPsecProposal with the set of
                   SATransforms that make up the proposal.
      DERIVED FROM PolicyComponent (see [PCIM])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   GroupComponent[ref IPsecProposal[0..n]]
                   PartComponent[ref SATransform[1..n]]
                   SequenceNumber
7.9.1. The Reference GroupComponent
   The property GroupComponent is inherited from PolicyComponent and is
   overridden to refer to an IPsecProposal instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that an SATransform instance may be associated
   with zero or more IPsecProposal instances.
7.9.2. The Reference PartComponent
   The property PartComponent is inherited from PolicyComponent and is
   overridden to refer to an SATransform instance.  The [1..n]
   cardinality indicates that an IPsecProposal instance MUST be
   associated with at least one SATransform instance.
7.9.3. The Property SequenceNumber
   The property SequenceNumber specifies the order of preference for the
   SATransforms of the same type.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         SequenceNumber
      DESCRIPTION  Specifies the preference order for the SATransforms
                   of the same type.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        Lower-valued transforms are preferred over transforms
                   of the same type with higher values.  For
                   ContainedTransforms that reference the same
                   IPsecProposal, SequenceNumber values must be unique.
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7.10. The Association Class SATransformInSystem
   The class SATransformInSystem weakly associates SATransforms with a
   System.  The class definition for SATransformInSystem System is as
   follows:
      NAME         SATransformInSystem
      DESCRIPTION  Weakly associates SATransforms with a System.
      DERIVED FROM PolicyInSystem (see [PCIM])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent[ref System[1..1]]
                   Dependent[ref SATransform[0..n] [weak]]
7.10.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from PolicyInSystem and is
   overridden to refer to a System instance.  The [1..1] cardinality
   indicates that an SATransform instance MUST be associated with one
   and only one System instance.
7.10.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from PolicyInSystem and is
   overridden to refer to an SATransform instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that a System instance may be associated with
   zero or more SATransform instances.
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8. IKE Service and Identity Classes
                +--------------+           +-------------------+
                |    System    |           | PeerIdentityEntry |
                |  ([CIMCORE]) |           +-------------------+
                +--------------+                     |*w
                      1| (a)                 (b)     |
                       +---+            +------------+
                           |            |
                           |*w        1 o
   +-------------+     +-------------------+    +---------------------+
   | PeerGateway |     | PeerIdentityTable |    | AutostartIKESetting |
   +-------------+     +-------------------+    +---------------------+
        *|                          *|               *|    *|
         +----------------------+    |(d)  +----------+     |
                  (c)          *|   *|    *|     (e)        |
                              *+------------+*              |(f)
             +-----------------| IKEService |-----+         |
             |      (g)        +------------+     |(h)      |
         0..1|                      *|           *|        *o
   +--------------------+            |    +---------------------------+
   | IPProtocolEndpoint |            |    | AutostartIKEConfiguration |
   |  ([CIMNETWORK])    |         (i)|    +---------------------------+
   +--------------------+            |
      0..1|                          |
          |(j)                       +----------------+
         *|                                           |*
   +-------------+* (k)  +------------+ +-----------------------------+
   | IKEIdentity |-------| Collection | | CredentialManagementService |
   +-------------+   0..1| ([CIMCORE])| |         ([CIMUSER])         |
         *|              +------------+ +-----------------------------+
          |(l)
         *|
   +--------------+
   |  Credential  |
   |  ([CIMUSER]) |
   +--------------+
      (a)  HostedPeerIdentityTable
      (b)  PeerIdentityMember
      (c)  IKEServicePeerGateway
      (d)  IKEServicePeerIdentityTable
      (e)  IKEAutostartSetting
      (f)  AutostartIKESettingContext
      (g)  IKEServiceForEndpoint
      (h)  IKEAutostartConfiguration
      (i)  IKEUsesCredentialManagementService
      (j)  EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity
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      (k)  CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity
      (l)  IKEIdentitysCredential
   This portion of the model contains additional information that is
   useful in applying the policy.  The IKEService class MAY be used to
   represent the IKE negotiation function in a system.  The IKEService
   uses the various tables that contain information about IKE peers as
   well as the configuration for specifying security associations that
   are started automatically.  The information in the PeerGateway,
   PeerIdentityTable and related classes is necessary to completely
   specify the policies.
   An interface (represented by an IPProtocolEndpoint) has an IKEService
   that provides the negotiation services for that interface.  That
   service MAY also have a list of security associations automatically
   started at the time the IKE service is initialized.
   The IKEService also has a set of identities that it may use in
   negotiations with its peers.  Those identities are associated with
   the interfaces (or collections of interfaces).
8.1. The Class IKEService
   The class IKEService represents the IKE negotiation function.  An
   instance of this service may provide that negotiation service for one
   or more interfaces (represented by the IPProtocolEndpoint class) of a
   System.  There may be multiple instances of IKE services on a System
   but only one per interface.  The class definition for IKEService is
   as follows:
      NAME         IKEService
      DESCRIPTION  IKEService is used to represent the IKE negotiation
                   function.
      DERIVED FROM Service (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
8.2. The Class PeerIdentityTable
   The class PeerIdentityTable aggregates the table entries that provide
   mappings between identities and their addresses.  The class
   definition for PeerIdentityTable is as follows:
      NAME         PeerIdentityTable
      DESCRIPTION  PeerIdentityTable aggregates PeerIdentityEntry
                   instances to provide a table of identity-address
                   mappings.
      DERIVED FROM Collection (see [CIMCORE])
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      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Name
8.2.1. The Property Name
   The property Name uniquely identifies the table.  The property is
   defined as follows:
      NAME         Name
      DESCRIPTION  Name uniquely identifies the table.
      SYNTAX       string
8.3. The Class PeerIdentityEntry
   The class PeerIdentityEntry specifies the mapping between peer
   identity and their IP address.  The class definition for
   PeerIdentityEntry is as follows:
      NAME         PeerIdentityEntry
      DESCRIPTION  PeerIdentityEntry provides a mapping between a peer’s
                   identity and address.
      DERIVED FROM LogicalElement (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   PeerIdentity
                   PeerIdentityType
                   PeerAddress
                   PeerAddressType
   The pre-shared key to be used with this peer (if applicable) is
   contained in an instance of the class SharedSecret (see [CIMUSER]).
   The pre-shared key is stored in the property Secret, the property
   protocol contains "IKE", the property algorithm contains the
   algorithm used to protect the secret (can be "PLAINTEXT" if the IPsec
   entity has no secret storage), the value of property RemoteID must
   match the PeerIdentity property of the PeerIdentityEntry instance
   describing the IKE peer.
8.3.1. The Property PeerIdentity
   The property PeerIdentity contains a string encoding of the Identity
   payload for the IKE peer.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         PeerIdentity
      DESCRIPTION  The PeerIdentity is the ID payload of a peer.
      SYNTAX       string
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8.3.2. The Property PeerIdentityType
   The property PeerIdentityType is an enumeration that specifies the
   type of the PeerIdentity.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         PeerIdentityType
      DESCRIPTION  PeerIdentityType is the type of the ID payload of a
                   peer.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        The enumeration values are specified in [DOI] section
                   4.6.2.1.
8.3.3. The Property PeerAddress
   The property PeerAddress specifies the string representation of the
   IP address of the peer formatted according to the appropriate
   convention as defined in the PeerAddressType property (e.g., dotted
   decimal notation).  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         PeerAddress
      DESCRIPTION  PeerAddress is the address of the peer with the ID
                   payload.
      SYNTAX       string
      VALUE        String representation of an IPv4 or IPv6 address.
8.3.4. The Property PeerAddressType
   The property PeerAddressType specifies the format of the PeerAddress
   property value.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         PeerAddressType
      DESCRIPTION  PeerAddressType is the type of address in
                   PeerAddress.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        0 - Unknown
                   1 - IPv4
                   2 - IPv6
8.4. The Class AutostartIKEConfiguration
   The class AutostartIKEConfiguration groups AutostartIKESetting
   instances into configuration sets.  When applied, the settings cause
   an IKE service to automatically start (negotiate or statically set as
   appropriate) the Security Associations.  The class definition for
   AutostartIKEConfiguration is as follows:
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      NAME         AutostartIKEConfiguration
      DESCRIPTION  A configuration set of AutostartIKESetting instances
                   to be automatically started by the IKE service.
      DERIVED FROM SystemConfiguration (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
8.5. The Class AutostartIKESetting
   The class AutostartIKESetting is used to automatically initiate IKE
   negotiations with peers (or statically create an SA) as specified in
   the AutostartIKESetting properties.  Appropriate actions are
   initiated according to the policy that matches the setting
   parameters.  The class definition for AutostartIKESetting is as
   follows:
      NAME         AutostartIKESetting
      DESCRIPTION  AutostartIKESetting is used to automatically initiate
                   IKE negotiations with peers or statically create an
                   SA.
      DERIVED FROM SystemSetting (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Phase1Only
                   AddressType
                   SourceAddress
                   SourcePort
                   DestinationAddress
                   DestinationPort
                   Protocol
8.5.1. The Property Phase1Only
   The property Phase1Only is used to limit the IKE negotiation to a
   phase 1 SA establishment only.  When set to False, both phase 1 and
   phase 2 SAs are negotiated.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         Phase1Only
      DESCRIPTION  Used to indicate whether a phase 1 only or both phase
                   1 and phase 2 security associations should attempt
                   establishment.
      SYNTAX       boolean
      VALUE        true - attempt to establish a phase 1 security
                   association
                   false - attempt to establish phase 1 and phase 2
                   security associations
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8.5.2. The Property AddressType
   The property AddressType specifies a type of the addresses in the
   SourceAddress and DestinationAddress properties.  The property is
   defined as follows:
      NAME         AddressType
      DESCRIPTION  AddressType is the type of address in SourceAddress
                   and DestinationAddress properties.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        0 - Unknown
                   1 - IPv4
                   2 - IPv6
8.5.3. The Property SourceAddress
   The property SourceAddress specifies the dotted-decimal or colon-
   decimal formatted IP address used as the source address in comparing
   with policy filter entries and used in any phase 2 negotiations.  The
   property is defined as follows:
      NAME         SourceAddress
      DESCRIPTION  The source address to compare with the filters to
                   determine the appropriate policy rule.
      SYNTAX       string
      VALUE        dotted-decimal or colon-decimal formatted IP address
8.5.4. The Property SourcePort
   The property SourcePort specifies the port number used as the source
   port in comparing policy filter entries and is used in any phase 2
   negotiations.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         SourcePort
      DESCRIPTION  The source port to compare with the filters to
                   determine the appropriate policy rule.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
8.5.5. The Property DestinationAddress
   The property DestinationAddress specifies the dotted-decimal or
   colon-decimal formatted IP address used as the destination address in
   comparing policy filter entries and is used in any phase 2
   negotiations.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         DestinationAddress
      DESCRIPTION  The destination address to compare with the filters
                   to determine the appropriate policy rule.
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      SYNTAX       string
      VALUE        dotted-decimal or colon-decimal formatted IP address
8.5.6. The Property DestinationPort
   The property DestinationPort specifies the port number used as the
   destination port in comparing policy filter entries and is used in
   any phase 2 negotiations.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         DestinationPort
      DESCRIPTION  The destination port to compare with the filters to
                   determine the appropriate policy rule.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
8.5.7. The Property Protocol
   The property Protocol specifies the protocol number used in comparing
   with policy filter entries and is used in any phase 2 negotiations.
   The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         Protocol
      DESCRIPTION  The protocol number used in comparing policy
                   filter entries.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 8-bit integer
8.6. The Class IKEIdentity
   The class IKEIdentity is used to represent the identities that may be
   used for an IPProtocolEndpoint (or collection of IPProtocolEndpoints)
   to identify the IKE Service in IKE phase 1 negotiations.  The policy
   IKEAction.UseIKEIdentityType specifies which type of the available
   identities to use in a negotiation exchange and the
   IKERule.IdentityContexts specifies the match values to be used, along
   with the local address, in selecting the appropriate identity for a
   negotiation.  The ElementID property value (defined in the parent
   class, UsersAccess) should be that of either the IPProtocolEndpoint
   or Collection of endpoints as appropriate.  The class definition for
   IKEIdentity is as follows:
      NAME         IKEIdentity
      DESCRIPTION  IKEIdentity is used to represent the identities that
                   may be used for an IPProtocolEndpoint (or collection
                   of IPProtocolEndpoints) to identify the IKE Service
                   in IKE phase 1 negotiations.
      DERIVED FROM UsersAccess (see [CIMUSER])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
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      PROPERTIES   IdentityType
                   IdentityValue
                   IdentityContexts
8.6.1. The Property IdentityType
   The property IdentityType is an enumeration that specifies the type
   of the IdentityValue.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         IdentityType
      DESCRIPTION  IdentityType is the type of the IdentityValue.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
      VALUE        The enumeration values are specified in [DOI] section
                   4.6.2.1.
8.6.2. The Property IdentityValue
   The property IdentityValue contains a string encoding of the Identity
   payload.  For IKEIdentity instances that are address types (i.e.,
   IPv4 or IPv6 addresses), the IdentityValue string value MAY be
   omitted; then the associated IPProtocolEndpoint (or appropriate
   member of the Collection of endpoints) is used as the identity value.
   The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         IdentityValue
      DESCRIPTION  IdentityValue contains a string encoding of the
                   Identity payload.
      SYNTAX       string
8.6.3. The Property IdentityContexts
   The IdentityContexts property is used to constrain the use of
   IKEIdentity instances to match that specified in the
   IKERule.IdentityContexts.  The IdentityContexts are formatted as
   policy roles and role combinations [PCIM] & [PCIME].  Each value
   represents one context or context combination.  Since this is a
   multi-valued property, more than one context or combination of
   contexts can be associated with a single IKEIdentity.  Each value is
   a string of the form:
      <ContextName>[&&<ContextName>]*
   where the individual context names appear in alphabetical order
   (according to the collating sequence for UCS-2).  If one or more
   values in the IKERule.IdentityContexts array match one or more
   IKEIdentity.IdentityContexts, then the identity’s context matches.
   (That is, each value of the IdentityContext array is an ORed
   condition.)  In combination with the address of the
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   IPProtocolEndpoint and IKEAction.UseIKEIdentityType, there SHOULD be
   exactly one IKEIdentity.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         IdentityContexts
      DESCRIPTION  The IKE service of a security endpoint may have
                   multiple identities for use in different situations.
                   The combination of the interface (represented by
                   the IPProtocolEndpoint), the identity type (as
                   specified in the IKEAction) and the IdentityContexts
                   selects a unique identity.
      SYNTAX       string array
      VALUE        string of the form <ContextName>[&&<ContextName>]*
8.7. The Association Class HostedPeerIdentityTable
   The class HostedPeerIdentityTable provides the name scoping
   relationship for PeerIdentityTable entries in a System.  The
   PeerIdentityTable is weak to the System.  The class definition for
   HostedPeerIdentityTable is as follows:
      NAME         HostedPeerIdentityTable
      DESCRIPTION  The PeerIdentityTable instances are weak (name scoped
                   by) the owning System.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref System[1..1]]
                   Dependent [ref PeerIdentityTable[0..n] [weak]]
8.7.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to a System instance.  The [1..1] cardinality
   indicates that a PeerIdentityTable instance MUST be associated in a
   weak relationship with one and only one System instance.
8.7.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to a PeerIdentityTable instance.  The [0..n] cardinality
   indicates that a System instance may be associated with zero or more
   PeerIdentityTable instances.
8.8. The Aggregation Class PeerIdentityMember
   The class PeerIdentityMember aggregates PeerIdentityEntry instances
   into a PeerIdentityTable.  This is a weak aggregation.  The class
   definition for PeerIdentityMember is as follows:
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      NAME         PeerIdentityMember
      DESCRIPTION  PeerIdentityMember aggregates PeerIdentityEntry
                   instances into a PeerIdentityTable.
      DERIVED FROM MemberOfCollection (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Collection [ref PeerIdentityTable[1..1]]
                   Member [ref PeerIdentityEntry [0..n] [weak]]
8.8.1. The Reference Collection
   The property Collection is inherited from MemberOfCollection and is
   overridden to refer to a PeerIdentityTable instance.  The [1..1]
   cardinality indicates that a PeerIdentityEntry instance MUST be
   associated with one and only one PeerIdentityTable instance (i.e.,
   PeerIdentityEntry instances are not shared across
   PeerIdentityTables).
8.8.2. The Reference Member
   The property Member is inherited from MemberOfCollection and is
   overridden to refer to a PeerIdentityEntry instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that a PeerIdentityTable instance may be
   associated with zero or more PeerIdentityEntry instances.
8.9. The Association Class IKEServicePeerGateway
   The class IKEServicePeerGateway provides the association between an
   IKEService and the list of PeerGateway instances that it uses in
   negotiating with security gateways.  The class definition for
   IKEServicePeerGateway is as follows:
      NAME         IKEServicePeerGateway
      DESCRIPTION  Associates an IKEService and the list of PeerGateway
                   instances that it uses in negotiating with security
                   gateways.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref PeerGateway[0..n]]
                   Dependent [ref IKEService[0..n]]
8.9.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to a PeerGateway instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that an IKEService instance may be associated
   with zero or more PeerGateway instances.
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8.9.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to an IKEService instance.  The [0..n] cardinality indicates
   that a PeerGateway instance may be associated with zero or more
   IKEService instances.
8.10. The Association Class IKEServicePeerIdentityTable
   The class IKEServicePeerIdentityTable provides the relationship
   between an IKEService and a PeerIdentityTable that it uses to map
   between addresses and identities as required.  The class definition
   for IKEServicePeerIdentityTable is as follows:
      NAME         IKEServicePeerIdentityTable
      DESCRIPTION  IKEServicePeerIdentityTable provides the relationship
                   between an IKEService and a PeerIdentityTable that it
                   uses.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref PeerIdentityTable[0..n]]
                   Dependent [ref IKEService[0..n]]
8.10.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to a PeerIdentityTable instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that an IKEService instance may be associated
   with zero or more PeerIdentityTable instances.
8.10.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to an IKEService instance.  The [0..n] cardinality indicates
   that a PeerIdentityTable instance may be associated with zero or more
   IKEService instances.
8.11. The Association Class IKEAutostartSetting
   The class IKEAutostartSetting associates an AutostartIKESetting with
   an IKEService that may use it to automatically start an IKE
   negotiation or create a static SA.  The class definition for
   IKEAutostartSetting is as follows:
      NAME         IKEAutostartSetting
      DESCRIPTION  Associates a AutostartIKESetting with an IKEService.
      DERIVED FROM ElementSetting (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
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      PROPERTIES   Element [ref IKEService[0..n]]
                   Setting [ref AutostartIKESetting[0..n]]
8.11.1. The Reference Element
   The property Element is inherited from ElementSetting and is
   overridden to refer to an IKEService instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates an AutostartIKESetting instance may be
   associated with zero or more IKEService instances.
8.11.2. The Reference Setting
   The property Setting is inherited from ElementSetting and is
   overridden to refer to an AutostartIKESetting instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that an IKEService instance may be associated
   with zero or more AutostartIKESetting instances.
8.12. The Aggregation Class AutostartIKESettingContext
   The class AutostartIKESettingContext aggregates the settings used to
   automatically start negotiations or create a static SA into a
   configuration set.  The class definition for
   AutostartIKESettingContext is as follows:
      NAME         AutostartIKESettingContext
      DESCRIPTION  AutostartIKESettingContext aggregates the
                   AutostartIKESetting instances into a configuration
                   set.
      DERIVED FROM SystemSettingContext (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Context [ref AutostartIKEConfiguration [0..n]]
                   Setting [ref AutostartIKESetting [0..n]]
                   SequenceNumber
8.12.1. The Reference Context
   The property Context is inherited from SystemSettingContext and is
   overridden to refer to an AutostartIKEConfiguration instance.  The
   [0..n] cardinality indicates that an AutostartIKESetting instance may
   be associated with zero or more AutostartIKEConfiguration instances
   (i.e., a setting may be in multiple configuration sets).
8.12.2. The Reference Setting
   The property Setting is inherited from SystemSettingContext and is
   overridden to refer to an AutostartIKESetting instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that an AutostartIKEConfiguration instance may
   be associated with zero or more AutostartIKESetting instances.
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8.12.3. The Property SequenceNumber
   The property SequenceNumber specifies the ordering to be used when
   starting negotiations or creating a static SA.  A zero value
   indicates that order is not significant and settings may be applied
   in parallel with other settings.  All other settings in the
   configuration are executed in sequence from lower to higher values.
   Sequence numbers need not be unique in an AutostartIKEConfiguration
   and order is not significant for settings with the same sequence
   number.  The property is defined as follows:
      NAME         SequenceNumber
      DESCRIPTION  The sequence in which the settings are applied
                   within a configuration set.
      SYNTAX       unsigned 16-bit integer
8.13. The Association Class IKEServiceForEndpoint
   The class IKEServiceForEndpoint provides the association showing
   which IKE service, if any, provides IKE negotiation services for
   which network interfaces.  The class definition for
   IKEServiceForEndpoint is as follows:
      NAME         IKEServiceForEndpoint
      DESCRIPTION  Associates an IPProtocolEndpoint with an IKEService
                   that provides negotiation services for the endpoint.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref IKEService[0..1]]
                   Dependent [ref IPProtocolEndpoint[0..n]]
8.13.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to an IKEService instance.  The [0..1]
   cardinality indicates that an IPProtocolEndpoint instance MUST by
   associated with at most one IKEService instance.
8.13.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to an IPProtocolEndpoint that is associated with at most one
   IKEService.  The [0..n] cardinality indicates an IKEService instance
   may be associated with zero or more IPProtocolEndpoint instances.
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8.14. The Association Class IKEAutostartConfiguration
   The class IKEAutostartConfiguration provides the relationship between
   an IKEService and a configuration set that it uses to automatically
   start a set of SAs.  The class definition for
   IKEAutostartConfiguration is as follows:
      NAME         IKEAutostartConfiguration
      DESCRIPTION  IKEAutostartConfiguration provides the relationship
                   between an IKEService and an
                   AutostartIKEConfiguration that it uses to
                   automatically start a set of SAs.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref AutostartIKEConfiguration [0..n]]
                   Dependent [ref IKEService [0..n]]
                   Active
8.14.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to an AutostartIKEConfiguration instance.  The
   [0..n] cardinality indicates that an IKEService instance may be
   associated with zero or more AutostartIKEConfiguration instances.
8.14.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to an IKEService instance.  The [0..n] cardinality indicates
   that an AutostartIKEConfiguration instance may be associated with
   zero or more IKEService instances.
8.14.3. The Property Active
   The property Active indicates whether the AutostartIKEConfiguration
   set is currently active for the associated IKEService.  That is, at
   boot time, the active configuration is used to automatically start
   IKE negotiations and create static SAs.  The property is defined as
   follows:
      NAME         Active
      DESCRIPTION  Active indicates whether the
                   AutostartIKEConfiguration set is currently active for
                   the associated IKEService.
      SYNTAX       boolean
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      VALUE        true - AutostartIKEConfiguration is currently active
                   for associated IKEService.
                   false - AutostartIKEConfiguration is currently
                   inactive for associated IKEService.
8.15. The Association Class IKEUsesCredentialManagementService
   The class IKEUsesCredentialManagementService defines the set of
   CredentialManagementService(s) that are trusted sources of
   credentials for IKE phase 1 negotiations.  The class definition for
   IKEUsesCredentialManagementService is as follows:
      NAME         IKEUsesCredentialManagementService
      DESCRIPTION  Associates the set of CredentialManagementService(s)
                   that are trusted by the IKEService as sources of
                   credentials used in IKE phase 1 negotiations.
      DERIVED FROM Dependency (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref CredentialManagementService [0..n]]
                   Dependent [ref IKEService [0..n]]
8.15.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from Dependency and is
   overridden to refer to a CredentialManagementService instance.  The
   [0..n] cardinality indicates that an IKEService instance may be
   associated with zero or more CredentialManagementService instances.
8.15.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from Dependency and is overridden
   to refer to an IKEService instance.  The [0..n] cardinality indicates
   that a CredentialManagementService instance may be associated with
   zero or more IKEService instances.
8.16. The Association Class EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity
   The class EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity associates an
   IPProtocolEndpoint with a set of IKEIdentity instances that may be
   used in negotiating security associations on the endpoint.  An
   IKEIdentity MUST be associated with either an IPProtocolEndpoint
   using this association or with a collection of IKEIdentity instances
   using the CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity association.  The class
   definition for EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity is as follows:
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      NAME         EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity
      DESCRIPTION  EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity associates an
                   IPProtocolEndpoint with a set of IKEIdentity
                   instances.
      DERIVED FROM ElementAsUser (see [CIMUSER])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref IPProtocolEndpoint [0..1]]
                   Dependent [ref IKEIdentity [0..n]]
8.16.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from ElementAsUser and is
   overridden to refer to an IPProtocolEndpoint instance.  The [0..1]
   cardinality indicates that an IKEIdentity instance MUST be associated
   with at most one IPProtocolEndpoint instance.
8.16.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from ElementAsUser and is
   overridden to refer to an IKEIdentity instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that an IPProtocolEndpoint instance may be
   associated with zero or more IKEIdentity instances.
8.17. The Association Class CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity
   The class CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity associates a Collection of
   IPProtocolEndpoint instances with a set of IKEIdentity instances that
   may be used in negotiating SAs for endpoints in the collection.  An
   IKEIdentity MUST be associated with either an IPProtocolEndpoint
   using the EndpointHasLocalIKEIdentity association or with a
   collection of IKEIdentity instances using this association.  The
   class definition for CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity is as follows:
      NAME         CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity
      DESCRIPTION  CollectionHasLocalIKEIdentity associates a collection
                   of IPProtocolEndpoint instances with a set of
                   IKEIdentity instances.
      DERIVED FROM ElementAsUser (see [CIMUSER])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref Collection [0..1]]
                   Dependent [ref IKEIdentity [0..n]]
8.17.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from ElementAsUser and is
   overridden to refer to a Collection instance.  The [0..1] cardinality
   indicates that an IKEIdentity instance MUST be associated with at
   most one Collection instance.
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8.17.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from ElementAsUser and is
   overridden to refer to an IKEIdentity instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that a Collection instance may be associated
   with zero or more IKEIdentity instances.
8.18. The Association Class IKEIdentitysCredential
   The class IKEIdentitysCredential is an association that relates a set
   of credentials to their corresponding local IKE Identities.  The
   class definition for IKEIdentitysCredential is as follows:
      NAME         IKEIdentitysCredential
      DESCRIPTION  IKEIdentitysCredential associates a set of
                   credentials to their corresponding local IKEIdentity.
      DERIVED FROM UsersCredential (see [CIMCORE])
      ABSTRACT     FALSE
      PROPERTIES   Antecedent [ref Credential [0..n]]
                   Dependent [ref IKEIdentity [0..n]]
8.18.1. The Reference Antecedent
   The property Antecedent is inherited from UsersCredential and is
   overridden to refer to a Credential instance.  The [0..n] cardinality
   indicates that the IKEIdentity instance may be associated with zero
   or more Credential instances.
8.18.2. The Reference Dependent
   The property Dependent is inherited from UsersCredential and is
   overridden to refer to an IKEIdentity instance.  The [0..n]
   cardinality indicates that a Credential instance may be associated
   with zero or more IKEIdentity instances.
9. Implementation Requirements
   The following table specifies which classes, properties, associations
   and aggregations MUST or SHOULD or MAY be implemented.
   4. Policy Classes
   4.1. The Class SARule..........................................MUST
   4.1.1. The Property PolicyRuleName..............................MAY
   4.1.1. The Property Enabled....................................MUST
   4.1.1. The Property ConditionListType..........................MUST
   4.1.1. The Property RuleUsage...................................MAY
   4.1.1. The Property Mandatory...................................MAY
   4.1.1. The Property SequencedActions...........................MUST
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   4.1.1. The Property PolicyRoles.................................MAY
   4.1.1. The Property PolicyDecisionStrategy......................MAY
   4.1.2  The Property ExecutionStrategy..........................MUST
   4.1.3  The Property LimitNegotiation............................MAY
   4.2. The Class IKERule.........................................MUST
   4.2.1. The Property IdentityContexts............................MAY
   4.3. The Class IPsecRule.......................................MUST
   4.4. The Association Class IPsecPolicyForEndpoint...............MAY
   4.4.1. The Reference Antecedent................................MUST
   4.4.2. The Reference Dependent.................................MUST
   4.5. The Association Class IPsecPolicyForSystem.................MAY
   4.5.1. The Reference Antecedent................................MUST
   4.5.2. The Reference Dependent.................................MUST
   4.6. The Aggregation Class SAConditionInRule...................MUST
   4.6.1. The Property GroupNumber..............................SHOULD
   4.6.1. The Property ConditionNegated.........................SHOULD
   4.6.2. The Reference GroupComponent............................MUST
   4.6.3. The Reference PartComponent.............................MUST
   4.7. The Aggregation Class PolicyActionInSARule................MUST
   4.7.1. The Reference GroupComponent............................MUST
   4.7.2. The Reference PartComponent.............................MUST
   4.7.3. The Property ActionOrder..............................SHOULD
   5. Condition and Filter Classes
   5.1. The Class SACondition.....................................MUST
   5.2. The Class IPHeadersFilter...............................SHOULD
   5.3. The Class CredentialFilterEntry............................MAY
   5.3.1. The Property MatchFieldName.............................MUST
   5.3.2. The Property MatchFieldValue............................MUST
   5.3.3. The Property CredentialType.............................MUST
   5.4. The Class IPSOFilterEntry..................................MAY
   5.4.1. The Property MatchConditionType.........................MUST
   5.4.2. The Property MatchConditionValue........................MUST
   5.5. The Class PeerIDPayloadFilterEntry.........................MAY
   5.5.1. The Property MatchIdentityType..........................MUST
   5.5.2. The Property MatchIdentityValue.........................MUST
   5.6. The Association Class FilterOfSACondition...............SHOULD
   5.6.1. The Reference Antecedent................................MUST
   5.6.2. The Reference Dependent.................................MUST
   5.7. The Association Class AcceptCredentialFrom.................MAY
   5.7.1. The Reference Antecedent................................MUST
   5.7.2. The Reference Dependent.................................MUST
   6. Action Classes
   6.1. The Class SAAction........................................MUST
   6.1.1. The Property DoActionLogging.............................MAY
   6.1.2. The Property DoPacketLogging.............................MAY
   6.2. The Class SAStaticAction..................................MUST
   6.2.1. The Property LifetimeSeconds............................MUST
   6.3. The Class IPsecBypassAction.............................SHOULD
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   6.4. The Class IPsecDiscardAction............................SHOULD
   6.5. The Class IKERejectAction..................................MAY
   6.6. The Class PreconfiguredSAAction...........................MUST
   6.6.1. The Property LifetimeKilobytes..........................MUST
   6.7. The Class PreconfiguredTransportAction....................MUST
   6.8. The Class PreconfiguredTunnelAction.......................MUST
   6.8.1. The Property DFHandling.................................MUST
   6.9. The Class SANegotiationAction.............................MUST
   6.10. The Class IKENegotiationAction...........................MUST
   6.10.1. The Property MinLifetimeSeconds.........................MAY
   6.10.2. The Property MinLifetimeKilobytes.......................MAY
   6.10.3. The Property IdleDurationSeconds........................MAY
   6.11. The Class IPsecAction....................................MUST
   6.11.1. The Property UsePFS....................................MUST
   6.11.2. The Property UseIKEGroup................................MAY
   6.11.3. The Property GroupId...................................MUST
   6.11.4. The Property Granularity.............................SHOULD
   6.11.5. The Property VendorID...................................MAY
   6.12. The Class IPsecTransportAction...........................MUST
   6.13. The Class IPsecTunnelAction..............................MUST
   6.13.1. The Property DFHandling................................MUST
   6.14. The Class IKEAction......................................MUST
   6.14.1. The Property ExchangeMode  ............................MUST
   6.14.2. The Property UseIKEIdentityType........................MUST
   6.14.3. The Property VendorID...................................MAY
   6.14.4. The Property AggressiveModeGroupId......................MAY
   6.15. The Class PeerGateway....................................MUST
   6.15.1. The Property Name....................................SHOULD
   6.15.2. The Property PeerIdentityType..........................MUST
   6.15.3. The Property PeerIdentity..............................MUST
   6.16. The Association Class PeerGatewayForTunnel...............MUST
   6.16.1. The Reference Antecedent...............................MUST
   6.16.2. The Reference Dependent................................MUST
   6.16.3. The Property SequenceNumber..........................SHOULD
   6.17. The Aggregation Class ContainedProposal..................MUST
   6.17.1. The Reference GroupComponent...........................MUST
   6.17.2. The Reference PartComponent............................MUST
   6.17.3. The Property SequenceNumber............................MUST
   6.18. The Association Class HostedPeerGatewayInformation........MAY
   6.18.1. The Reference Antecedent...............................MUST
   6.18.2. The Reference Dependent................................MUST
   6.19. The Association Class TransformOfPreconfiguredAction.....MUST
   6.19.1. The Reference Antecedent...............................MUST
   6.19.2. The Reference Dependent................................MUST
   6.19.3. The Property SPI.......................................MUST
   6.19.4. The Property Direction.................................MUST
   6.20. The Association Class PeerGatewayForPreconfiguredTunnel..MUST
   6.20.1. The Reference Antecedent...............................MUST
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10. Security Considerations
   This document only describes an information model for IPsec policy.
   It does not detail security requirements for storage or delivery of
   said information.
   Physical models derived from this information model MUST implement
   the relevant security for storage and delivery.  Most of the classes
   (e.g., IpHeadersFilter, SAAction,...) MUST at least provided the
   integrity service; other pieces of information MUST also receive the
   confidentiality service (e.g., SharedSecret as described in the
   classes PeerIdentityEntry and PreconfiguredSAAction).
11. Intellectual Property Statement
   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
   has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on the
   IETF’s procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
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   Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
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   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF Executive
   Director.
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